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I. INTRODUCTION 
It seems to be a common assumption that physical places like parks, 
sidewalks, and public squares, and "cyber-places" like the Web, constitute 
separate locations of communication. In reality, however, the intersection 
and collision of these two spaces is imminent. In some respects it has 
already occurred. Entire cities and counties are erecting wireless "clouds" 
that will bring the Internet to vast public spaces.1 Technologies of 
surveillance continue to proliferate. What one does and says in public 
places is increasingly subject to surveillance by means of a combination 
of hand-held devices and official surveillance tools like closed circuit 
television cameras (CCTV).2 There may soon be a continuous, running 
record of most public activities. People in public places are also carrying 
1. See Sewell Chan, After Delays, Wireless Web Comes to Parks, N.Y. TIMEs, July 6, 2006, 
at Bl (reporting plans to provide free wireless access in many New York City parks). The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia plans to become the first country to go completely wireless. See 
Nicholas Wood, Macedonia Dreams of One Nation, Wireless, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 2006, at A9. 
Rhode Island has plans to become the first American state to go wireless from border to border. See 
Jesse Noyes, R.I. Planning to Go WiFi, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 29, 2006, at 19. For a summary of 
local government wireless activity to date, see Sharon E. Gillett, Municipal Wireless Broadband: 
Hype or Harbinger?, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 565-81 (2006). 
2. See Aimee Jodoi Lum, Comment, Don't Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded on 
a Camera Phone: The Need for Privacy in the Public Sphere, 27 U. HAw. L. REv. 377, 396-404 
(2005) (discussing privacy and public voyeurism laws). Closed circuit television (CCTV) systems 
typically involve a dedicated communications link between cameras and monitors. This permits 
cameras to be viewed and operated from a control room. See CCTV: Constant Cameras Track 
Violators, NAT'L lNST. OF JUSTICE, July 2003, at 16 (explaining CCTV technology). 
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and wearing ever more sophisticated computing devices. Pervasive 
personal computing is mobilizing communication and affecting public 
interaction in ways we are only now beginning to appreciate. Among other 
things, it is blurring the line between private and public communication. 
Anyone who has ever been stuck in traffic behind a car in which a 
pornographic DVD is being displayed has glimpsed this phenomenon. 
Like it or not, the era of"drive-by pornography" is now upon us.3 
Technology is altering the fundamental character of public places. 
Increasingly, when we are in public, we occupy "networked" places.4 
Some scholars have already noted the significant Fourth Amendment 
privacy concerns raised by the networking of public places.5 These 
concerns will be exacerbated as the technologies of communication and 
surveillance become more widespread and more sophisticated. The 
networking of public places will also give rise to a host ofless-commented 
upon free speech issues.6 Place is a critical component of expressive 
activity. 7 The transformation of material public places into networked ones 
will fundamentally change what it means to speak, petition, associate, and 
exercise press rights in public. 
This Article provides a comprehensive assessment of the First 
Amendment issues related to the networking of public places. The changes 
brought about by the networking of public places will affect a number of 
First Amendment doctrines and principles. This Article considers six basic 
3. See Rachel Leonard, 'Dirty Driving' Sore Spot for Legislators, Officers, SPARTANBURG 
HERALD-J., Jan. 12, 2006, http:/ /goupstate.com/apps/pbcs.dlUarticle? AID=/ 20060 112/NEWS/ 
60112037211051/NEWSOl%22. 
4. See Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Square, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 93, 94 (2005) ("If the line between cyberspace and real space has grown 
increasingly difficult to draw, it may soon become impossible."). The term "networked" has been 
applied to spaces in other contexts. Writing specifically about cyberspace, for example, Julie Cohen 
has argued that we are witnessing the rise of a new type of social space, which she calls "networked 
space." Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 117 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), 
available at http://www.lawgeorgetown.edu/faculty/jec/cyberspace.pd£ This Article adapts the 
concept to emphasize the effect new technologies, including but not limited to the Internet, will 
have on public places and public expression. 
5. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 
(2000); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the 
Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1349, 1426-33 
(2004); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right 
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002). 
6. For a thoughtful discussion regarding the effects that monitoring urban public space may 
have on anonymity, see Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Dangers of Fighting Terrorism With 
Technocommunitarianism: Constitutional Protections of Free Expression, Exploration, and 
Unmonitored Activity in Urban Spaces, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 677, 702-19 (2005). 
7. See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REv. 581, 617-25 (2006) 
(describing the importance of public places to expressive rights) [hereinafter Zick, Speech and 
Spatial Tactics]. 
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categories or clusters of speech issues raised by the networking of public 
places: property or public forum, public captivity, protection (from 
harmful speech), public protest, privacy (in terms of both identity and 
thought), and press. 
Having cities and other governmental entities, rather than private 
interests, provide public wireless Internet connections raises questions 
about ownership, control, access, and neutrality. Are these public wireless 
networks just another public utility? Are they speech forums? Will 
governments, or their private partners, be able to filter public Web access? 
Is there a constitutional right to public connectivity and access in the same 
sense that there is a right to speak and assemble on the streets? Will 
governments, or their state-actor private partners, have unfettered access 
to information about public network users? 
Public "captivity'' will also become a larger concern. As the drive-by 
pornography example shows, the networking of public places will expose 
audiences to speech in public that has to this point been either entirely 
private or effectively segregated in material places. Sexually explicit 
content and ubiquitous advertising will be more prevalent in networked 
places. Citizens will carry this content with them into the networked public 
square. We will all potentially be more "captive" in networked public 
places-on buses, in subway cars, in parks and government buildings-to 
speech that we have generally been able to avoid in material public 
places. 8 To what extent can or should the law protect listeners and viewers 
from this expression? 
As the captivity problem indicates, exposure to harmful speech in 
networked public places will become increasingly difficult to regulate. The 
networking of public places will alter the form and character of public 
expression. It will, for example, permit speakers to use devices to virtually 
approach listeners and viewers. Network features will affect concepts such 
as imminence and risk, which have been critical to the application of First 
Amendment doctrines like fighting words, threats, and incitement to 
unlawful action. As public places become networked, we must consider 
what form of protection will be available to viewers and listeners when 
they encounter such things as mobile sexually explicit speech, virtual 
harassment, cyber-spamming, and other forms ofharmful speech in public 
places. 
The networking of public places will also substantially affect public 
protests and demonstrations. Networking features will facilitate assembly 
by providing platforms for social capital and the means for spontaneous 
8. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971 )(holding that viewers must avert their 
eyes when confronted with offensive speech in courthouse corridors); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office 
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (''No one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling 
recipient."). 
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action. But they will also facilitate official and unofficial surveillance, as 
public and private cameras are increasingly used to record events in the 
public square. On balance, will the networking of public places render 
self-governing activities like protesting and petitioning too costly for most 
citizens? . 
The devices we carry, outfitted with Global Positioning System (GPS) 
technologies, will facilitate surveillance and tracking. The networked 
environment will compel us to constantly authenticate ourselves. Vast 
public areas will be under constant surveillance. In light of these 
eventualities, will the ability to shield speaker or associative identity be 
fundamentally compromised? Looking even further into the future, will 
biometric technologies, including those that can literally read faces, 
expose even private thoughts? Will digital environments compel us to 
speak in public against our will? 
Finally, in a networked environment, should every citizen with the 
capacity to record and publish be deemed a member of the press? Should 
the truthful "reporting" of public events by "citizen-journalists" be 
shielded by the First Amendment from tort and other forms of civil 
liability, even when that reporting impinges on significant public privacy 
concerns? 
Serious First Amendment concerns will be raised as the networking of 
public places proceeds. First Amendment doctrines and principles will be 
challenged by this transformation, just as they have been challenged by 
technological revolutions in the past. But the stakes of spatial networking 
are actually much higher than these doctrinal concerns indicate. 
Ultimately, we are facing a fundamental makeover of public places. 
Although they serve many purposes, public places are a collective 
democratic and expressive concern. They facilitate identity and equality 
claims. They allow for a wide variety of democratic participation. They 
lend transparency t.o both expressive claims and regulation of public 
expression. While we are considering First Amendment concerns, we 
ought also to ask how networked public places will affect core speech 
values, like self-government and civic interaction, in the traditional public 
marketplace of ideas. What will all of this networking do to public places? 
The networking of public places will alter the nature, character, and 
democratic functions of public places and public expression. It will 
influence who speaks, where they may communicate, and what they will 
say. It will render speakers more knowable to authorities, but in many 
cases less knowable to one another. People will increasingly interact with 
devices in public, rather than with one another. Digitization will make 
some speech, and most speech regulation, less transparent to all of us. All 
of these changes threaten to render public places less capable of serving 
their traditional democratic functions. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II will distinguish material public 
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places from networked ones, with specific attention to the speech 
implications inherent in the transformation of public places. It will 
describe the networking of public places-the technological, social, and 
environmental changes that are fundamentally transforming material 
public places. Part ill will address the substantive First Amendment 
issues-public forum, public captivity, protection from harmful speech, 
protest, privacy, and press-raised by the networking of public places. Part 
IV will look beyond these primarily doctrinal considerations. Drawing 
upon urban geography and sociology literature, it will critically examine 
the civic character of networked public places in light of the First 
Amendment functions and values public places ideally ought to serve. 
ll. FROM MATERIAL TO NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES 
Much of First Amendment doctrine has developed with regard to a 
material model of public places. Public expression has taken place in a 
familiar cluster of places, from streets to malls to public squares to public 
parks. The first section ofthis Part will describe the general characteristics 
of public expression in material, non-networked public places. It will also 
touch upon the principal speech doctrines that have developed in this 
physical environment. The second section of this Part will describe the 
primary network technologies that will or are already reshaping public 
places and public expression. Three basic developments will be addressed. 
First, governments are currently providing, or partnering with private 
actors to provide, wireless Internet access in vast public areas. Second, 
governments have installed and are continuing to install surveillance 
equipment, including hundreds of thousands ofCCTV monitors, in many 
public places. Third, individuals are carrying and wearing advanced 
communications technologies in public places. These devices will 
communicate with other devices and with the environment itself, which is 
also becoming embedded with computing devices. 
A. Speech in Material Public Places 
To understand the effect that the networking of public places will have 
on public expression, it is useful to begin with a brief discussion of the 
expressive characteristics that have traditionally defined material public 
places. In material places, the principles of geography, physicality, 
anonymity and equality have largely determined the contours of public 
express ton. 
The geography of material public places consists ofbricks, mortar, and 
other tangible features. This geography provides the basic framework for 
public expression. In theory, the scope of public speech rights depends 
upon the geographic location the speaker inhabits. Thus, public streets, 
parks, and sidewalks are quintessential public forums in which speech 
2007] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES 7 
rights are at their apex. 9 These places have "immemorially'' been open for 
expressive purposes. 10 Most other public places may or may not be open 
to expression, more or less at the government's discretion. 11 Under the 
public forum and time, place, and manner doctrines, governments are 
entitled to maintain public and quasi-public places to effectively serve the 
governments' primary purposes. 12 The primary purpose of most public and 
quasi-public places-the reason they were constructed-relates to 
concerns other than expression, such as traffic flow, travel, the provision 
of services, or recreation. 13 · 
The government's relationship to geography or place is essentially that 
of a property manager or proprietor. Governments own the streets, parks, 
and other public places, in the sense that they have title to them. 
Governments have been responsible for providing whatever improvements 
or upgrades are necessary for the continued functioning of these places. 
Formally, governments have no interest in, indeed are forbidden from 
regulating, the content that is delivered by speakers to audiences on the 
streets, in the parks, or in other public places. 14 Governments have never 
had any formal constitutional obligation to facilitate expression by 
building new places for it. Access to existing forums, however, has always 
been nominally available to all members of the public, regardless of a 
member's means or status. There have never been public expression "fast 
lanes" on the streets for those with greater means. 15 
In their capacity as proprietors, governments have always observed and 
regulated public places. But they have done so mostly to ensure that a 
basic sense of order and decorum prevails there. Although there has 
always been some policing of public places, these activities have been 
subject to realities such as limited funding and manpower. Thus, at any 
given moment, most public places are not policed at all-in the sense that 
official eyes are not focused upon them. 
The geography of public places has itself been used to police and to 
9. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) 
(describing tiers of public fora). 
I 0. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of 
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions."). 
11. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 4 73 U.S. 788, 802-03 ( 1985) (noting 
that governmental intent is a key indicator of forum status and expressive rights in public places). 
12. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
13. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 460 U.S. 672, 682 (1992) 
(noting that airport terminal was constructed primarily for travel, not expressive activity). 
14. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (describing content neutrality requirement). 
15. Of course, means are never entirely irrelevant. A speaker wishing to use certain public 
parks must, for example, have the means to pay the fee for a permit. 
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regulate public expression. The Supreme Court has held that the 
transmission of obscenity and other illegal content can be prohibited 
altogether to produce a certain "quality of life" and "tone of commerce" 
in public places. 16 The time, place, and manner doctrine permits a 
government to zone or spatially restrict any speech it wishes, so long as 
the restriction is content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and leaves open ample 
alternative avenues of communication.17 In recent years officials have 
become experts at this zoning. 18 Sexually explicit expression has been 
dispersed or concentrated spatially, purportedly to combat the "secondary 
effects" associated with it. 19 Political displays of contention have 
increasingly been subjected to expressive zoning of various forms.20 
Zoning has become a very efficient means of sanitizing large public areas 
from expression that many may fmd quite offensive, harmful, or even just 
aesthetically distasteful. 21 
Geography and "spatiality'' work in this fashion because public 
expression is itself physical, tangible, and grounded. It is intimately 
connected to and influenced by material places. This connection has 
rendered most public expression open and transparent. Confrontations, 
incitements to action, and demonstrations have generally been seen, 
experienced, and lived events. This fundamental fact has substantially 
shaped the contours of doctrines typically applied in public speech 
contexts. To define speech as a threat, for example, requires that the 
recipient have some reasonable fear of physical harm.22 A cross burning 
several feet from a back yard probably suffices to create the requisite 
fear. 23 Invitations to brawls (so-called "fighting words"), incitements to 
unlawful actions, and the idea of audience "hostility" are all based on 
16. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 51-58 (1973); see also Millerv. California, 
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (defining "obscenity''). 
17. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (noting that 
time, place, and manner regulations must be justified without regard to the content of speech, 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication). 
18. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 7, at 589-606 (discussing spatial zoning 
tactics). 
19. See Youngv. Am. Mini-Theatres, lnc.,427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholdingzoningofsexually 
explicit expression). 
20. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 7, at 589-606 (describing various spatial 
restrictions). 
21. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511-12 (1981) (plurality 
opinion) (indicating that a content-neutral ban on all outdoor advertising signs would be 
permissible). 
22. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,708 (1969)(describing"truethreats" doctrine). 
23. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (stating that if requisite intent to 
intimidate the victim could be proven, a burning cross may constitute a ''true threat"). 
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elements of proximity, immediacy, and visibility.24 These content 
categories and scenarios can be effectively regulated under circumstances 
where the speech or speech acts can be witnessed, proven, and hence 
prosecuted. This was the underlying assumption when each of these 
categories was created. 
Of course, the vast majority of public expression is neither illegal nor 
harmful to viewers or listeners. Thus, there is no reason to police it. As we 
go about our public lives, from sitting on a park bench reading a book to 
engaging in assemblies and peaceful protests with others, we expect that 
we are doing so anonymously.25 In public places we are not, of course, 
anonymous in the sense that our identities are wholly private and cannot 
be discovered.26 But when engaged in speech activities in public places, 
we do not expect to be constantly monitored. Beyond mere expectations, 
there is at least a minimal First Amendment right to remain anonymous in 
certain public settings. Thus, in Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 27 
the Court invalidated an election law that prohibited the circulation of 
anonymous leaflets in connection with political campaigns.28 The retention 
of anonymity in this circumstance is "a shield from the tyranny of the 
majority."29 It can be relied upon to "protect unpopular individuals from 
retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant 
society."30 
In a broader sense, whether or not we are engaged in core political 
pamphleteering we still expect that much of what we do in public will 
remain unremarked upon and unrecorded. We expect to blend into what 
Alan Westin has called the "situationallandscape."31 One can of course 
effectively undermine or even waive such an expectation. He may, for 
example, publicly burn a United States flag to garner attention for a cause 
24. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 ( 1969) (per curiam) (defining "incitement" 
category); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951) (upholding disorderly conduct 
conviction where crowd had become hostile to speaker); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568,572 (1942) (defining fighting words as those which "tend to incite an immediate breach ofthe 
peace"). 
25. For discussions of the principle of public anonymity, see Blitz, supra note 6, at 697-702; 
Slobogin, supra note 5, at 237-45. 
26. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
fromoneplaceto another."); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14(1973) ("No person can have 
a reasonable expectation that ... his face will be a mystery to the world."). 
27. 514 u.s. 334 (1995). 
28. /d. at 357. 
29. /d. (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATNE 
GoVERNMENT 1, 3-4 (R. B. McCallum ed., 1948)). 
30. /d. 
31. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1967); see Blitz, supra note 6, at 683 
(remarking on public anonymity and the "freedom to fade"). 
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or message.32 But barring this sort of activity, people in material public 
places quite reasonably have assumed that they can blend into a crowd. 
This expectation has doubtlessly contributed to the shape of our public 
expressive culture. It has provided critical space for difference in public 
expression. That is not to say that speech in material public places is 
altogether free-wheeling, particularly in light of the proliferation of spatial 
controls and social norms that have limited it. But our public expressive 
culture has historically been one that has tolerated expression that is 
disruptive, boisterous, loud, and unconventional. In material public places, 
an expectation of public anonymity has provided speakers the freedom to 
engage in public displays that might otherwise have been substantially 
chilled. 
Finally, in terms of general principles, material public places have 
historically been equalizing or leveling forces. Those lacking the means 
for more sophisticated expression have tended to use public places to 
convey messages that might otherwise have been silenced by market 
forces. Many "poorly financed causes of little people"33 have relied upon 
places like streets, sidewalks, and areas surrounding facilities like airports, 
train stations, and public buildings to garner attention and convey 
messages. In this sense and others, public places and public expression 
have played a critical democratizing role in our society. Because this 
expression has been tangible and public, it has been quite difficult to 
ignore. At the least, public places have provided "little people"34 an 
opportunity to interrupt the daily routine of public life and to force others 
to consider their claims. 
The elements of geography, physicality, anonymity, and equality have 
substantially shaped the nature and tenor of our public expressive culture. 
As the next section will demonstrate, the networking of public places will 
affect each of these elements. 
B. The Networking of Public Places 
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are three primary features 
associated with the networking of public places. The first is the 
establishment, by governmental entities, of vast public Internet access 
networks. The second is the continued proliferation of surveillance devices 
32. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating state law prohibiting the 
desecration of the flag). 
33. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). See generally Timothy Zick, 
Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 439 (2006) 
(discussing the importance of place to marginalized speakers and their expressive activity) 
[hereinafter Zick, Space, Place, and Speech]. 
34. See Martin, 319 U.S. at 146 (referring to the common members of society as the "little 
people"). 
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that continuously record public activity. And the third is the pervasive use 
of mobile personal computing devices in public places. This process of 
spatial networking will fundamentally change how information is 
conveyed, shared, and received in public places. It will alter the manner 
in which public places are policed and regulated. It will challenge and 
strain each of the fundamental precepts of material public 
places-geography, physicality, anonymity, and equality-discussed 
above. 
1. Wireless Clouds-"Muni WiFi" 
Urban "hot spots," where anyone with the proper device can connect 
to the Internet, have been around for years. Some of the earliest wireless 
fidelity (WiFi) networks were patched together by Internet anarchists bent 
on creating a wireless commons. 35 Other early WiFi networks were the 
result of corporate-sponsored initiatives, meant to draw people to 
Starbucks and other quasi-public places and keep them there. For the first 
time, people were able to stay connected even while outside the home or 
office. 
These were relatively small-scale experiments. But the early projects 
forecast an imminent intersection of so-called "cyberplaces" and material 
places on a much grander scale.36 As the proprietors of vast public places, 
including many rural ones where Internet connectivity was spotty or 
simply non-existent, governments eventually became interested in 
providing WiFi to their citizenries. 
WiFi is now draped over vast areas of public space. More than 200 
cities, counties, and regions are currently providing or planning to provide 
some form of public wireless Internet access.37 Increasing areas are now 
covered with wireless clouds or "meshes," as the networks are often 
called. For example, Suffolk County on Long Island, New York, has 
installed a WiFi network that will reach some 1.5 million people and cover 
900 square miles.38 Philadelphia's new WiFi network will cover most of 
the city's approximately 135 square miles.39 San Francisco is taking bids 
35. See generally Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless 
Communication, 82 TEx. L. REV. 863 (2004) (explaining concept of the wireless commons). 
36. See generally Cohen, supra note 4 (critiquing the notion that "cyberspaces" constitute 
actual places). 
37. MuniWireless, June 2006 Update of Wireless Cities and Counties in the U.S., 
http://www.muniwireless.com/reports/docs/June-7-2006summary.pdf (listing cities and regions 
that have developed Muni WiFi plans or already have operational networks). 
38. Bruce Lambert, Suffolk County Plans to Offer Free Wireless Internet Access, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2006, at B4. 
39. Wireless Philadelphia Executive Committee, Briefing: A 21st Century Opportunity, 
http://www.phila.gov/wireless/briefing.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). 
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for an ambitious WiFi project.40 New York City has already installed 
wireless hot spots in many of its vast park areas.41 New clouds are rising 
over cities and suburbs every day. Indeed, entire states aspire to become 
unified wireless communications networks.42 
Muni WiFi networks will provide public access to the Internet in parks, 
squares, public buildings, airport terminals, and literally wherever else 
citizens can carry their remote computing devices.43 Some networks, like 
New York City's, will provide free connectivity, at least for now.44 Other 
municipalities, concerned about expenses associated with developing and 
operating the wireless networks, plan to charge citizens for access.45 Some, 
like San Francisco, have considered plans to offer "premium" connectivity 
for a fee, while relegating free users to a much slower connection speed.46 
There may be enormous educational and expressive benefits to Muni 
WiFi. In many rural communities, Muni WiFi will help close the digital 
divide.47 It will enable activities like distance learning, coordinated 
policing, and other public services, and provide vast amounts of 
information to citizens. Despite these benefits, Muni WiFi has been a 
controversial undertaking. Until now, the provision of Internet access has 
primarily been a private venture. Bowing to pressure from the 
telecommunications industry, fifteen state legislatures have prohibited 
municipalities from offering public WiFi access.48 At the time of writing, 
Congress is currently considering proposed legislation that would institute 
a nationwide ban, although the prospects for enactment appear slim.49 
40. Cf Press Release, S.F. Dep't ofTelecomm. & Info. Servs., San Francisco Concludes 
Evaluation of Proposals to Create Universal, Affordable Wireless Broadband Network (Apr. 5, 
2006), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/tech_connect_page.asp?id=38562. 
41. Chan, supra note 1, at B5. 
42. See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 1. 
43. Although some municipalities have proposed offering access for free, perhaps supported 
by advertising revenue, the vast majority of the networks are subsidized. 
44. See Sewell Chan, Deadline Set for Wireless Internet in Parks, N.Y. TiMEs, May 16, 2006, 
at Bl. 
45. See, e.g., James Dao, Philadelphia Hopes for a Wireless Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2005, at AI. 
46. See Laurie J. Flynn, Some Wo"ies as San Francisco Goes Wireless, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 
10, 2006, at C3. 
47. See Tim Gnatek, Switchboard in the Sky, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at Gl. 
48. CNETNews.com, Municipal Broadband Nationwide, http://news.com.com/Municipal+ 
broadband+and+wireless+projects+map/2009-1 034 _3-5690287 .html (last visited Oct. I, 2006) 
(detailing a map of the various Muni WiFi projects and state laws designed to limit them). The 
prohibiting legislation is described at MuniWireless, Anti-Municipal Broadband Bills in the U.S., 
http://muniwireless.com/municipal/579 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). 
49. Broadband Investment and Consumer Choice Act, S. 1504, 1 09th Cong. (2005). This is 
one of two dueling proposals in Congress. The other proposal would overturn the fifteen state bans, 
allowing municipalities and other state subdivisions to undertake WiFi projects. See Community 
Broadband Act of2005, S. 1294, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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The principal arguments against Muni WiFi are based on efficiency 
concerns and the purported lack of need for the service. Telecom interests 
contend that there is no shortage of supply or market gap to fill.50 
Supporters ofMuni WiFi suggest that the bottom line is the bottom line: 
Telecom companies want to provide public wireless access and reap the 
profits. 51 On the merits, supporters argue that Muni WiFi is simply another 
utility-like electricity, roads, sewers, and water-that government should 
provide. 52 Some, like San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, have argued 
that Internet access is a "fundamental right" of the modem citizen. 53 
Whatever the merits of the economic and rights arguments, efforts to 
stall or prevent the spread of Muni WiFi appear to be going nowhere. 
Public access to the Internet is already, or will shortly become, a reality in 
most large urban centers, an increasing number of suburbs, and many rural 
areas that have thus far been under-served in terms of Internet access. 54 
Consideration of the full effects of Muni WiFi on public places and 
public expression must await a description of the remainder of the process 
by which material public places will become networked public places. But 
one can readily surmise some of the effects wireless clouds may have on 
the public expressive environment. In Parts ill and IV, I will return to 
some of the themes sketched here. 
Wireless clouds will alter the fundamental geography of material 
public places. To some extent they bring us closer to exploding the very 
concept of place itself. Cyberspace scholars often speak of the Web and 
other venues as separate virtual spaces. 55 But with public wireless access 
and other pervasive computing technologies, described below, where one 
happens to be will become far less important to one's ability to 
communicate. To some extent terms like online and offline will cease to 
matter. 
On-the-ground expression will be affected by wireless clouds floating 
above public places. The clouds will facilitate mobile communication and 
50. See NEW MILLENNIUM RESEARCH COUNCIL, NOT IN THE PUBUC INTEREST-THE 
MYTH OF MUNICIPAL WI-FI NETWORKS 2, http://www.newmillenniumresearch.org/archive/ 
wifireport2305.pdf(February 2005) (noting that there is no shortage ofbroadband service in cities). 
51. See, e.g., Carol Ellison, Muni Wireless: The Battle Continues, eWEEK.com, Jan. 25,2005, 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,l759,1754164,00.asp (arguing that telecom companies' interest 
in muni wi-fi is about market protection). 
52. See Lawrence Lessig, Why Your Broadband Sucks, WIRED, Mar. 2005, available at 
http://wired.com/wired/archive/l3.03/viewlhtml?pg=5 (arguing that municipalities should be 
allowed to compete in the wireless market and provide common good of wireless access as they 
have public roads). 
53. Verne Kopytoff, Fierce Wi-Fi Fight Expected In S.F., S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 2005, at Cl. 
54. See MuniWireless, supra note 37. 
55. See Cohen, supra note 4 (discussing the idea that cyberspace is different from "real 
space"). 
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public information access. In networked public areas, private and public 
speech will mix and blend, as people bring the Web with them into public 
places. As a result, geography and place will become less reliable tools for 
restricting access and exposure to information that is harmful, offensive, 
or simply irritating. The Web will spill into public places. 
The manner in which public speakers and audiences interact will also 
be affected by all of this cloud cover. Tangible and physical forms of 
expression will be replaced by virtual communications of various types. 
We are already increasingly distracted in public areas. Add to the cell 
phone and the MP3 player other mobile devices that connect to the 
Internet no matter where in public one happens to be, and people will be 
even more likely to engage devices rather than one another. The noise of 
the streets and parks will be replaced more and more by quiet 
concentration on personal screens. The very sights and sounds of public 
expression will change. 
Wireless clouds will facilitate official and unofficial surveillance of 
public acts, including expression, association, and information-gathering. 
This will threaten public anonymity. Will the books or newspapers I am 
reading online as I sit on a park bench be recorded? Will my associations 
arouse suspicion? Will I even know? 
The participants in public speech rituals and displays may also change. 
For those without personal computing devices, with no access or perhaps 
very slow access, the nature of public places will become that much more 
alienating and foreign. The digital divide that some experience at home 
will now go public, with new classes of haves and have-nots in public 
areas. 56 Public places may thus become less of an equalizing force. 
2. Surveillance Square 
Surveillance of public and quasi-public activities is not a new 
phenomenon. Private and quasi-public places have been under the 
camera's watchful eye since at least the late 1950s.57 Banks were very 
early adopters of surveillance technologies. They used CCTV networks to 
monitor their vaults and their customers. Other commercial places, like 
malls and department stores, have also long placed customers and spaces 
under surveillance. 58 
Two things, however, are very different in the modem era. The first is 
56. See generally HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES: PROSPECTS FOR THE 
POSITIVE USE OF ADVANCED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (Donald A. Schon eta!. eds., 1999) 
(discussing the scope of innovative technologies penetration into low-income urban areas). 
57. Quentin Burrows, Note, Scowl Because You're On Candid Camera: Privacy and Video 
Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 1079, 1080 (1997). 
58. /d. 
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the prevalence of public surveillance, in terms of both the numbers of 
cameras and the quantity of space they cover. The second is the 
technology itself, which enables surveillance that differs vastly in 
quality-that is, in the degree of its potential intrusiveness-from past 
generations. 
Surveillance technology has become a mainstay of quintessentially 
public places like streets, city centers, and parks. The proliferation began 
in the streets, as officials sought new and efficient ways to police street 
crime.59 Municipalities have long trained cameras on high-crime areas.60 
They later used these technologies for other purposes, for instance to 
cheaply and efficiently monitor traffic and issue citations for traffic 
violations. 
Heightened security concerns, especially since the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, have led to the further proliferation of public 
surveillance.61 The United States has not yet reached the surveillance 
heights of Great Britain, "the champion of CCTV surveillance," with 
between two and three million public cameras in operation.62 But at the 
mere start of developing a surveillance society, we already have hundreds 
of thousands of CCTV cameras watching over our public places. One 
scholar has suggested that video surveillance will likely "increase 
exponentially in the next decade. "63 
As one might expect, surveillance has recently become more prevalent 
in cities that may be at greatest risk from terrorist attacks. New York City 
has just begun to install and operate an extensive public surveillance 
system. 64 The city plans a first installment of 500 cameras, at a cost of $9 
million, with more to follow depending on the amount of funds received 
59. See generally Raymond Surette, Video Street Patrol: Media Technology and Street 
Crime, 13 POUCE SCI. & ADMIN. 78 (1985) (discussing early uses ofCCTV to police public crime). 
60. /d. The primary official justification for these extensive official surveillance systems has 
been crime detection and prevention. There is a serious debate concerning whether this justification 
is empirically defensible. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 224-30 (surveying evidence on crime 
prevention and deterrence). 
61. This proliferation has also resulted in use of many privately maintained and operated 
video surveillance systems that are trained on public spaces. Many of the video feeds from these 
cameras can be linked to publicly operated surveillance systems. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 222. 
62. See id. British experience with CCTV has been extensively scrutinized. For a review of 
the literature, see Stephen Greenhalgh, Literature Review of Privacy and Surveillance Affecting 
Social Behavior (Aug. 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
63. Slobogin, supra note 5, at 219; see also Simon G. Davies, Re-Engineering the Right to 
Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 150 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (estimating 20-
30% annual increase in public video surveillance). 
64. See Tom Hays, NYPD Deploys First of 500 Security Cameras, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 
16, 2006, available at http://www.officer.com/article/printer.jsp?id=29927 &siteSection=8. 
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from the Federal Department of Homeland Security.65 Ultimately the plan 
is to have several thousand wireless video cameras positioned atop lamp 
posts and on public buildings. New York City officials envision a "ring of 
steel" in parts of Lower Manhattan, one that resembles the plan recently 
implemented in London's financial district.66 The public surveillance plan 
is not limited to Manhattan. It calls for placing surveillance cameras 
throughout the five boroughs. Surveillance of underground public areas is 
also already widespread. New York City now has 1,000 cameras in its 
subway system, and expects to have over 2,000 in place by 2008.67 
The District of Columbia has also experienced a rapid rise in public 
surveillance. Large areas in and around the capital are under the 
jurisdiction of both local and federal authorities. The Metropolitan Police 
Department has a relatively modest public surveillance program. In 2002, 
for example, police used more than a dozen automated surveillance 
cameras to watch anti-war protests and a "March for Life" event.68 The 
police department's cameras are located throughout the National Mall and 
surrounding areas.69 They target especially those places where marches 
and protests typically occur. 
The National Park Service also operates surveillance cameras in and 
around various federal properties in the District, including the National 
Mall.70 Unlike the D.C. surveillance system, which so far has been used 
primarily during large public events, the Park Service's system is always 
operational. 71 Thus, if you are near the White House or the Vietnam 
Memorial, for example, you are under surveillance. 
Other large urban areas are increasingly implementing large-scale 
public surveillance projects. Chicago recently spent $5 million adding 250 
cameras to its current 2,000-camera system, one of the nation's most 
extensive.72 Washington and Philadelphia have made similar 
65. /d. 
66. ld 
67. /d. 
68. See D. C. Police to Scan Crowds with Cameras, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 21, 2002, 
at 05A. 
69. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: INFORMATION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT'S USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO MONITOR SELECTED FEDERAL PROPERTY 
INWASHINGTON,D.C. 10-14 (June 2003) (hereinafter GAO REPORT] (describing D.C. Metropolitan 
Police Department's use ofCCTV). 
70. See id. at 15-16. 
71. /d. at 15. The District is considering authorizing daily use of surveillance cameras in 
certain areas. See Gary Emer1ing, District Will Be Looking At You, WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 16, 2006, 
at AI. 
72. Stephen Kinzer, Chicago Moving to 'Smart' Surveillance Cameras, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 
21, 2004, at AI. 
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investments. 73 However, the phenomenon is not limited to large cities. 
Cities like Tampa, Florida and Memphis, Tennessee, and even smaller 
municipalities have also recently invested in public surveillance 
programs. 74 As Department of Homeland Security grant money continues 
to flow to communities across the country, CCTV systems will likely 
become more and more prevalent, and potentially more intrusive, in public 
areas. 
The latest generation of surveillance cameras has exceptional 
capabilities. Most have panning and tilting features. Some have zoom 
lenses "that can read the wording on a cigarette packet at 1 00 yards and 
bring nighttime images up to daylight level. "75 Systems of the future will 
have features like motion detectors, facial recognition, biometric 
technology, and even X-ray or see-through capabilities.76 The records 
these machines will create will also be different. Older technologies relied 
on conventional videotape for information storage. Newer CCTV 
technology will rely upon digitization. 77 This will make it easier to store 
information for much longer periods of time. 
These advances are remarkable. As one organization recently put it, 
"( w ]hat was once the grist of science fiction novels is quickly becoming 
the reality of modem law enforcement."78 With these surveillance 
technologies, it will be possible for authorities to identify, trace, and 
continually track a person the moment he enters the public square. 79 It will 
be possible to read what each citizen is reading, to see who he sees, to 
know where he has been and perhaps where he is going. It may at some 
point be possible to read his face by employing facial reading 
technologies. Much of this monitoring will be automated. The cameras 
will not operate in isolation. Along with public wireless networks and, as 
explained below, pervasive personal computing, surveillance technologies 
will be merely one aspect of a larger information network embedded in 
73. See Hays, supra note 64 (noting recent CCTV expenditures by various municipalities). 
74. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 220 (''Newark, N.J., Tampa, Fl., Virginia Beach, Va., and 
Memphis, Tenn., all have cameras, ranging in number from six to seventy-two, that cover large 
areas of public real estate .... "). 
75. See id. at 222. 
76. See id. at 223. 
77. See id. 
78. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE 
TO PROTECTING COMMUNITIES AND PRESERVING CML LffiERTIES 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pd£1video _surveillance _guidelines I. pdf. 
79. In the UK, officials are preparing to initiate Celldar, a project that will permit surveillance 
of individuals based on the signals emitted from their cellphones. The system will allow officials 
to watch vehicles and individuals almost anywhere and any time, from up to hundreds of miles 
away. See Jason Burke & Peter Warren, How Mobile Phones Let Spies See Our Every Move, 
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct. 13, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/mobile/article/ 
0,2763,811 034,00.html. 
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public places. The information collected will not merely disappear once 
the person leaves the public square. It will be retained and may even 
become part of a digital dossier. 
The proliferation of public surveillance raises serious privacy concerns. 
In terms of public expression, these developments may change the 
geography of public space by marking off vast areas that will now be 
under public surveillance. Officials will no longer be limited to policing 
expression that they happen to witness on the scene and in real time. A less 
transparent but more efficient spatial regulatory regime will facilitate 
continuous policing of public areas. 80 
Even if citizens do not know the details of surveillance, they will know 
that they are being watched. This may affect the books they read in public, 
the protests in which they are willing to participate, and the displays in 
which they are willing to take part in while in public places. The 
expectation of public anonymity will be undermined, if not entirely 
eliminated. The choice to reveal oneself and one's actions will no longer 
be the speaker's. 
In terms of equality, certain ''undesirable" populations, like the 
homeless or public agitators, may be displaced from certain areas as a 
result of constant surveillance. Those without the proper digital 
identification may be prevented from entering certain areas of the public 
square at all. 
3. Pervasive Computing and Mobile Technologies 
There is, finally, one additional feature that will complete the 
networking of public places. This element is perhaps the most critical to 
public communication and interaction. Networked places will not only 
have clouds hovering over them and cameras watching activity in them. 
The architecture of public places will be embedded with digital tags and 
networked information. Professors Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff call this 
already ongoing phenomenon "pervasive computing. "81 Pervasive 
computing "is what happens when the Internet gets ubiquitous, embedded, 
80. Despite the privacy and other implications of extensive CCTV use, at this point there is 
very little transparency in the adoption or use of the technology. Some municipalities have 
disclosed the location of their surveillance cameras. But other institutions, including the National 
Park Service, have not made this information public. See GAO REPORT, supra note 69, at 16. Few 
laws or regulations currently govern public CCTV use. Public participation in its adoption has been 
minimal. The Park Service, for example, has never sought public comment on its use of CCTV in 
areas of the National Mall. /d. at 4. Few municipalities have developed comprehensive controls for 
the use and operation of public surveillance, including protections for private data collected as a 
result of surveillance. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 233-37. 
81. Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 94. 
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and animated. "82 Professors Kang and Cuff describe the expected result of 
this embedding process: "Imagine not a robot, not an isolated and 
identifiable device, but a world saturated with networked intelligence. "83 
The digitally saturated world will give rise to new communicative 
forms, facilitate social networking, and produce a flow of environment-to-
person communication not possible in inert material public places. The 
devices people wear or carry with them-personal computers, personal 
digital assistants, mobile telephones, and devices not yet conceived-will 
facilitate both person-to-person and person-to-place communication. 
Social interaction, including expressive activity, may change dramatically 
when, as Kang and Cuff put it, "a digital nervous system [is] grafted into 
the material world. "84 
In terms of expressive liberties, perhaps the greatest promise lies in the 
power the networked place will have to enhance social networking. As 
political scientists and sociologists have noted, contentious displays and 
social movements require social capital and coordinated action. 85 The 
Internet is already filling some of the gaps in otherwise frayed social 
networks.86 Once in public places, protesters and demonstrators will be 
able to take advantage of pervasive networks to create smarter and more 
spontaneous assemblies. They will be able to use their personal devices to 
tactically assemble all at once, in places that are most effective. 
This phenomenon has been referred to as "swarming."87 Even when it 
was limited to technologies of text messaging, swarming proved to be a 
powerful weapon of political dissent. During the 1999 World Trade 
Organization protests in Seattle, activists relied upon mobile phones and 
public networking to thwart some official efforts at repression. 88 With 
public Internet access now becoming widely available, swarming will 
likely migrate to the Web. Anyone with a connection will be able to 
participate, across media, seamlessly. 
Smaller assemblies might also form as a result of pervasive and mobile 
communications devices. Digitized tags and GPS intelligence that we 
carry on our person will notify contacts in our vicinity of our precise 
location. 89 This could lead to spontaneous gatherings, as people quickly 
82. !d. 
83. !d. at 95. 
84. !d. at 112. 
85. See, e.g., BERT KLANDERMANS, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROTEST 15-16 (1997) 
(explaining processes of protest formation). 
86. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 27 (2000) (noting the decline in social networks, community, and social capital). 
87. See HOWARD RHEINGOW, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION ch. 7 (2002) 
(describing public swarming and its effect on political environments around the globe). 
88. See id. at 160-62. 
89. See Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 104 ("For instance, when you enter the shopping mall, 
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find one another in real time and real places. Through personal computing 
devices, we will also be able to leave digital trails of information to be 
found by those who come after us. The networked environment may 
become a dynamic digital bulletin board. 
On a more retail or personal level, hand-held devices will enable 
strangers to learn bits of information about one another in public places.90 
Devices will "read" one another, allowing for a form of virtual personal 
reconnaissance.91 Bluetooth technologies will allow for virtual approaches 
and communication with those occupying the same public spaces and 
using similar devices. 92 Right now, these opportunities are limited to those 
using similar devices and sharing the same network. But this phenomenon 
may someday extend beyond the similarly networked. One can already 
imagine a world in which each person has access to the same pervasive 
network. 
Person-to-environment communication will be a frequent occurrence 
in networked public places. People will not merely traverse public places; 
they will interact with them.93 The physical environment "will be able to 
respond directly to what it senses. "94 As a speaker walks past a certain 
public place, she may receive an automated flow of information about 
conditions, directions, or dangers in that place.95 She may automatically 
receive advertisements for products near that place, based on a geographic 
reading of her hand-held or worn device. 96 The flow of information will go 
in two directions. People will be able to communicate back to the 
environment and to interact with it. 97 
Pervasive personal computing will also render each citizen a mobile 
recording unit. The cell phones they carry will enable not only 
all friends in your social network who are nearby can be buzzed.") (footnote omitted). 
90. See id at I 10 ("PO A-sized gadgets that provide this sort of datasense about fellow 
conference attendees have already rolled out.") (footnote omitted). 
91. See id. 
92. Bluetooth technologies facilitate the exchange of information between personal devices 
like cell phones and the connectivity of personal computing devices in close proximity to one 
another. See Wikipedia, Bluetooth, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki!Bluetooth (last visited Oct. 2, 
2006). 
93. See John Markoff & Martin Fackler, With a Gel/phone As My Guide, N.Y. TiMEs, June 
28, 2006, at C 1 (describing phones that combine satellite technology with wireless web as "a 
missing link between cyberspace and the physical world"). 
94. Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 94. 
95. ld at 110 (describing this information flow as "a sort of sixth sense, adatasense"). This 
will be made possible largely by the proliferation of embedded radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags. See id. at 97-98 (describing RFID technology). 
96. !d. at 110 ("As you pass by a commercial center, you receive a visual note on your 
dashboard that your favorite brand of shoes is on sale .... "). 
97. Kang and Cuff raise the possibility that public billboards may actually change content 
depending on who happens to be passing by a location. !d. at 112. 
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photography but also uploading of streaming video. Personal surveillance 
has already been a useful tool for protesters, who have used their own 
record of events to contradict what has been put forward by police as the 
official record of events on the street.98 But there is a larger issue here. 
Pervasive computing devices will make on-the-scene reporting by citizens 
a much more common event. There are already projects underway creating 
spaces on the Web that will act as public clearinghouses for photos, 
videos, and reporting sent in by citizens all over the world. 99 When we are 
in public, we will be watched not only by officials, but by an army of 
citizen-journalists too. 
The digital nervous system and personal computing appendages 
attached to it will alter fundamental features of material public places. The 
geography will no longer be something we merely stand or walk upon. We 
will interact through and with it. As noted above, the mobility of 
expression will confound efforts to spatially regulate it. As public speech 
becomes more and more digital and virtual, it will lose its traditional 
tangible and physical character. Listeners and viewers will communicate 
via an additional sense, what Kang and Cuff call a "datasense."100 Virtual 
expression and "datasensing" will be more difficult to police, in part 
because these communications will not be physical and visible. 
In addition, the mobile technologies we carry or wear will allow us 
constantly to be identified and authenticated as we pass through physical 
places. 101 Public anonymity will be further diluted. The basic choice 
whether to speak will no longer be completely our own. Disclosure will be 
automated; in some sense expression will be a product of our consent to 
carrying or wearing the latest devices as we travel around in public. As 
noted, some people carrying those devices will be able to "report" on the 
acts of others, adding another layer of public surveillance. Finally, in terms 
of the traditional equality of material places, only the digitally privileged 
will be able to participate fully in networked public places. The digital 
nervous system will be possessed only by those who possess the latest 
technologies. The new have-nots will be missing more than a critical 
hardware and computer connection: They will lack an increasingly critical 
sense-a datasense. 
98. See infra note 314 and accompanying text. 
99. See Mark Glaser, Stanford Fellow Imagines Every Cell Phone as Citizen Media 
Outlet, MEDIASHIIT, July 18,2006, http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2006/07 /digging_ deeperstanford 
_fellow.html. A mockup of such a site is available at www.inthefieldonline.net. 
100. Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 110. 
101. /d. at 106; see also Kevin D. Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 
(forthcoming 2007) (noting that universal connectivity will facilitate the tracking of individuals). 
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ill. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES 
This Part will translate the geography, physicality, anonymity, and 
equality concerns raised by the networking of public places into explicit 
First Amendment concerns. Most of the commentary, in legal and social 
science communities, has centered upon the effect surveillance 
technologies will have on privacy rights. 102 Cameras are only a single 
feature of a much larger and more sophisticated network. The "digital 
nervous system" is, or at some point will be, an integrated system. 
Surveillance cameras will be linked to public Web access. Mobile data 
tags will be linked to surveillance technologies. Personal computing 
devices will link to the environment, to other devices, to surveillance 
networks, and to various information clearinghouses on the Web. The 
progression to networked public places will affect a variety of First 
Amendment principles and doctrines. 
A. Property: The Legal Status of Wireless Clouds 
Large-scale municipal wireless projects have been greeted as either the 
unremarkable provision of an important public utility or an unnecessary 
and unwise interference with traditional private provision of Web access. 
Mostly ignored so far have been the serious free speech concerns that arise 
as governments step in to provide direct access to a critical communicative 
medium like the Internet. 
In terms of the provision of communicative infrastructure, Muni WiFi 
clouds are unprecedented. How should we conceptualize the wireless 
clouds hanging over public areas? We might view the provision of public 
Internet access as analogous to the provision of water, electricity, or other 
public utilities. In one sense the analogy has some merit. As they have in 
other public goods contexts, governments are stepping in and providing, 
or partnering with private entities to provide, a critical public 
infrastructure. This is what happened with electricity and sewers. Internet 
connectivity, one might say, is fast becoming as critical to the modem 
citizen as these other services. Governments thus naturally ought to 
provide the service of public connectivity. 
Ultimately, however, this analogy to public utilities is fundamentally 
flawed. For one thing, there is already a flourishing private market for the 
provision of Internet access. At least in many urban and suburban areas, 
a network of hot spots has been developing for some time. With private 
providers seemingly in no short supply, one might wonder if there is really 
102. Professors Kang and Cuff do adopt a somewhat broader perspective. As discussed in Part 
IV, infra, they examine the implications of pervasive computing for the health of the public sphere 
generally. See Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 115-21; see also Blitz, supra note 6, at 697-702 
(discussing First Amendment anonymity concerns related to public surveillance). 
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some market failure to correct. As a matter solely of economics, then, 
there may be sound reasons for governments to stay out of the Internet 
connectivity market. 
But the analogy to other public services suffers from a much deeper 
flaw than market economics indicate. Simply put, electricity and sewage 
are nothing like the information that will flow as a result of wireless 
clouds and meshes. Governmental provision of electricity, for example, 
raises no serious constitutional concerns. Assuming the service has not 
been entirely privatized, thus removing constitutional concerns, 
governments must merely refrain from inequitable provision of services 
and satisfy basic due process requirements. 103 But Muni Wi-Fi is no 
ordinary public utility in this regard. 
For the first time, governments (and in some cases their private 
partners as state actors) will provide and control the backbone of a 
communications network over which vast amounts of public 
communications will flow. This invokes an altogether different analogy. 
Putting wireless clouds in the sky is like building a public road solely for 
communicative purposes. This is much more akin to providing an 
expressive forum than a mere public utility. When governments provide 
access to information through such forums, First Amendment issues of 
access and content control inevitably arise. Government provision of 
wireless clouds will likely raise similar issues. Suppose, for example, a 
municipality is not willing to provide unfettered connectivity. As noted, 
the Web defies the sort of spatial control that material places often 
facilitate. Owing to its architecture, access to the Web is not partial. How 
long will it be before concerned citizens or groups object to public 
provision of access to pornography, or hateful expression, or morally 
offensive materials? How long before suspected terrorists are tracked 
through the public network? Or suppose a citizen claims a right of access 
to the portal site to convey a message. Does she have a right to post 
information there? 
Although the scope ofMuni WiFi projects is unprecedented, this is not 
the first time that government has provided Internet access in a public 
place. Nor is it the first time government has confronted issues relating to 
Internet access control. By 2000, 95% of public libraries were offering 
Internet access, most through a federal funding program. 104 When public 
libraries installed their Internet connections, the entire Web flowed into 
the library space, much as Muni WiFi will introduce the Web to larger 
public areas. Reports of adults and children accessing sexually explicit 
materials in public libraries, and of patrons exposing others to this 
103. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that due process 
and equal protection claims could not be brought against a private utility). 
104. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003). 
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material, quickly began to surface. 105 When this situation came to 
Congress's attention, it enacted the Children's Internet Protection Act,106 
which requires that libraries take steps to prevent access to obscenity, child 
pornography, and materials deemed harmful to minors or face the loss of 
certain federal funds. 107 
The libraries sued, arguing that filtering patron access was an 
infringement on patrons' First Amendment rights and undermined their 
own mission to provide access to the widest possible range of 
information. 108 The Supreme Court dismissed these arguments. 109 1t noted 
that public libraries had always exercised discretion in selecting collection 
materials and that sexually explicit materials have historically not been 
found on their shelves. 110 Moreover, the Court noted that neither a public 
library's collection nor the Web itself is a "forum" for expressive 
purposes. 111 The Internet, the Court noted, was of far too recent vintage to 
be considered a quintessential public forum like a street or park. 112 
Moreover, according to the Court, libraries do not provide Internet access 
to encourage the dissemination of a variety of viewpoints; rather, they 
provide it for the same reasons they provide access to other materials-for 
education, research, and recreation. 113 Thus, no speaker could claim a right 
to use a public library's Internet service to reach a public audience. 
What does the library experience suggest about the legal and 
constitutional status of governmentally installed wireless clouds? As the 
Court noted in the library context, the Web itself cannot be deemed a 
"traditional" public forum because this resource is simply too new to have 
been "immemorially ... held in trust for the use of the public."114 
Governmental provision oflnternet access is yet another circumstance that 
highlights the inflexibility of the Court's rules for categorizing public 
105. See id. at 200 (describing evidence of patron access). A much fuller account of public 
library experiences with Internet access can be found in the opinion of the trial court three-judge 
panel. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,422-27 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd, 
539 u.s. 194 (2003). 
l 06. Pub. L. No. l 06-554 tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000). 
107. 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f) (West 2006); 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(h)(6) (West 2006). 
108. Am. Library Ass 'n, 539 U.S. at 210. 
109. /d. at 211. The author wishes to disclose that he worked on this case on the government's 
behalf in the lower courts. 
110. See id. at 205 ("Public library staffs necessarily consider content in making collection 
decisions and enjoy broad discretion in making them."). 
111. /d. at 206. 
112. /d. at 205-06. 
113. /d. at 206. 
114. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) 
(limiting category of "traditional" public forums to include only streets, sidewalks, and public 
parks). 
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places. 115 Through Muni WiFi programs, the Internet is becoming a 
resource held in trust for public communicative activity. Under current 
doctrine, however, the wireless clouds do not create a traditional 
expressive forum. 
It is more likely that by providing a link to the Internet, municipalities 
are displaying the requisite intent to establish a "designated" public forum 
for the exchange of a diversity of ideas and information. 116 Unlike public 
libraries, municipalities have not historically exercised editorial discretion 
in terms of the content conveyed in public places. Indeed, they are 
generally forbidden under the First Amendment from taking the content 
of expression into account. And unlike libraries, municipalities are 
providing the connection to encourage the dissemination of a variety of 
viewpoints. Thus, any municipal filtering of public Internet access would 
have to meet the highest standard of judicial scrutiny. 117 
Even if a municipality could convincingly argue that it had a 
compelling interest to filter (for example, to protect children from public 
exposure to certain materials deemed harmful to minors), it is doubtful that 
any sufficiently tailored means for serving that interest could be fashioned. 
Filters are certainly far more technologically advanced today than they 
were a decade or more ago. But no filter can currently screen solely illegal 
content from the Web, leaving the remainder undisturbed. 118 Under the 
statutes regulating Internet access in public libraries, patrons can simply 
request that a librarian unblock a website if they are denied access. 119 
However workable this sort of system might be in the limited public space 
of the library, it cannot be used in vast public areas. Who would decide 
whether to unblock a site? On what basis? Pursuant to what procedures? 
Nor will any citizen likely prevail in asserting an access claim to the 
public Web portal site. Assuming advertising or other speech does not 
appear there, the portal site likely would be deemed a non-public forum. 
Municipalities could thus prohibit private expression there. Use of the 
network will be protected; use of the portal will not be. 
Having created a forum with its wireless clouds, a municipality will 
115. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 33, at 456-59 (describing primary 
criticisms of public forum doctrine). 
116. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1985) 
(noting that government must make an affirmative choice to open a "designated" public forum). 
117. It is unlikely that municipalities will grant speakers right of access to any home or 
registration page they use as a portal. Unless governments open that space to diverse expression, 
the homepage would likely constitute a non-public forum, a resource generally under governmental 
control. 
118. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d401, 449 (2002), rev 'd, 539 U.S. 
194 (2003) (noting that filters routinely block innocuous materials). 
119. See Children's Internet Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9134(t)(3)(2000) (disabling offi1ter 
permitted for adults and minors). 
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have no choice but to provide the entirety of the Web in public places. The 
Web will spill into the public square, just as it initially flowed into the 
public libraries. Public exposure to expression that might once have been 
the province of home-bound devices has already begun to raise privacy 
and public captivity concerns. We shall tum to these next. 
B. Public "Captivity" 
The ubiquity of the Web, combined with pervasive and mobile 
computing devices, will alter accepted notions of private and public 
expression. We may become captives to public expression we do not wish 
to see or hear. Technologies like mobile phones and other personal devices 
will thrust speech on unwilling audiences in public places, on the streets, 
on buses and subways, and in parks. 
Some of this expression will be sexually explicit. Cell phone providers 
are already providing pornographic content in other countries; the U.S. 
market is not far behind. 120 This will make it possible to view sexually 
explicit content virtually anywhere, anytime. Several complaints have 
already been raised by drivers who were subjected to a nearby car's 
playing of a pornographic DVD, which is clearly visible, especially during 
evening hours. 121 As well, new forms of targeted advertising or spamming 
that rely upon the GPS features in personal devices will bombard an 
already advertising-saturated public. 122 Will the First Amendment permit 
any reprieve from these potential nuisances? 
The First Amendment provides some limited protection for the captive 
listener or viewer who cannot reasonably avoid unwanted expression. Just 
as there are rights to see or hear expression, there are corollary rights not 
to see or hear. 123 The right to be let alone is most vigorously enforced 
when the listener or viewer is in the home, because of the strength of the 
privacy interest in that place and the practical difficulties of avoidance. 124 
120. See Gary Strauss, Cellphone Technology Rings in Pornography in USA, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 13, 2005, at l D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/techlproducts/services/2005-12-12-
pornography-cellphones _ x.htm. 
121. See Playing at an SUV Near You: Porn, CBS NEWS, Mar. ll, 2004, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/ll/nationaVrnain605394.shtml (reporting incidents of 
pornography displayed in vehicles). 
122. See generally Adam Mossoff, Spam-Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
625 (2004) (discussing the problem of unsolicited email correspondence, or "spam"). 
123. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (recognizing limited right 
not to receive information); see also Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not 
to Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 153 (1972) (discussing doctrine of captivity). 
124. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,484-85 (1988) (discussing private captivity cases). 
Even in the home, a viewer or listener must often resort to self-help, such as depositing 
objectionable mail in the waste basket. Consol. Edison Co. ofN. Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
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New technologies always pose distinct problems in terms of their ability 
to thrust content into places like the home. In FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 125 for example, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulations 
prohibiting the broadcast of "indecent" expression over the airwaves 
during certain hours of the day when children and unwilling adults might 
be listening. 126 The Court reasoned that radio broadcasts of indecent 
expression were akin to an "assault" from which homeowners were 
entitled to some protection. 127 Similar reasoning was recently invoked by 
courts to uphold the federal "do-not-call registry," which prevents most 
telephone solicitors from disturbing people while at home. 128 
In public places, however, self-help is the primary means of protection 
from unwanted expression. The listener or viewer is generally expected to 
avert her eyes from public expression she does not care to see or hear. In 
Cohen v. California, 129 the Court held that viewers in public courthouse 
corridors could protect themselves by averting their eyes from Cohen's 
offensive jacket, which was emblazoned with the words "Fuck the 
Draft."130 In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 131 the Court invalidated an 
ordinance that would have banned all nudity in outdoor movie theatres. 132 
The audience, even while driving on the public highways and thus 
potentially (and quite dangerously) distracted by the display, was required 
to turn a blind eye to what appeared on the screen. 133 
The networking of public places will challenge fundamental notions of 
public and private. The mobility of private forms of expression will render 
those private forms increasingly a matter of public concern. When public 
places are networked, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain a 
basic level of public repose. The "assaults" may come from many 
directions at once. Private offensive expression will move closer and 
closer to unwilling or undecided audiences. The nudity on the public 
movie screen will appear on the screen in the car sitting in traffic in front 
125. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
126. !d. at 738. 
127. !d. at 748-49. 
128. See FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850 (lOth Cir. 2003) (per curiam) 
(upholding federal "do-not-call" registry). 
129. 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
130. !d. at 21. 
131. 422 u.s. 205 (1975). 
132. !d. at 213. 
133. In one instance the Supreme Court did embrace something like the right to be let alone 
in a quintessential public forum. In Hill v. Colorado, the Court upheld an 8-foot bubble between 
abortion clinic sidewalk counselors and clinic patrons on public sidewalks. 530 U.S. 703, 726-27 
(2000). In that context, the Court said, a woman was entitled to some protection for her 
psychological repose. See id. at 717-18. The Court, however, has shown no inclination to extend 
the right to be let alone to other public areas. 
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of you. The pornographic magazine will be digitized and transported onto 
the subway or bus, or into a public park, airport terminal, or other public 
place. 134 
One would expect (or at least hope) that social norms and decorum 
would prevent the most intrusive encroachments on others' public 
tranquility and repose. But if some drivers are willing to view sexually 
explicit material in the car on a public road or in a parking lot, what will 
stop them from doing so in other public places? 135 Carrying explicit 
magazines into public places like buses and parks is quite different, in 
social terms, from transporting it by way of personal computing devices. 
The latter have already achieved a substantial degree of public acceptance. 
They are fast becoming perceived human necessities. They are part of the 
public environment. 
Right now, the doctrine or principle of captivity offers very little 
protection for the unwilling recipient of public expression. But cases like 
Cohen and Erznoznik were decided before mobile content devices 
proliferated in public places. These decisions were products of a model of 
public expression based upon material, not networked, places. That model 
generally facilitated a spatial segregation of offensive expression no longer 
possible in networked public places. The question is whether the 
networking of public places counsels a change in principle when it comes 
to public captivity. 
Although it has been reluctant to grant the unwilling audience broad 
rights to be let alone in public, the Court has indicated that the matter 
requires "delicate balancing. "136 On one hand, new technologies will make 
it easier to thrust expression into the visual and auditory fields of unwilling 
audiences, including children, thus affecting the tranquility and livability 
of public places. On the other hand, we are becoming all too proficient at 
filtering out the background and foreground noises of everyday life. We 
already use personal computing devices to defend ourselves from outside 
interferences and to build a wall of separation between ourselves and 
others. 
Cases like buses and subway cars remain most problematic, given the 
difficulties of escaping unwanted speech and the reliance upon these 
134. For those who doubt the possibility, the author offers one personal anecdote. Recently, 
while sitting in a cafe, I witnessed a patron viewing a pornographic website on his laptop in full 
view of other patrons, including several children. The parents quickly removed the children. The 
adults, including the author, pretended not to notice. 
135. The limits of reliance upon social norms are apparent on the subways. In New York City, 
there have been several recent arrests for sexually menacing behavior like flashing. See Anemona 
Hartocollis, Women Have Seen It All on Subway, Unwillingly, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2006, at AI 
(reporting incidents of flashing and groping on city subways). 
136. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208. 
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modes of transportation by many people. But one might surmise that few 
today would be as distressed as Justice Douglas was in Public Utilities 
Commission v. Pollak137 at the prospect of radio transmissions being piped 
onto public buses. 138 Douglas, in dissent, strongly objected to the invasion 
of public privacy and repose brought about by these transmissions, in no 
small part because the government had something to do with their 
content. 139 Today's rider may not even hear such transmissions, so 
ensconced is she in her own technological bubble. One might also suspect 
that our sensibilities, including our expectations with regard to public 
repose, have changed dramatically since the 1950s. Justice Douglas's 
outrage was in some sense a product of his times. Modem citizens' 
tolerance for the thrusting of expression is likely much higher, by sheer 
necessity, than that of generations past. 
We have not yet reached a point where freedom of expression must 
give way to a public right of repose or tranquility. But this may change 
depending on our experiences in networked public places. The Supreme 
Court has, at least in one context, supported the right of listeners to be let 
alone in public places. 140 There are already laws under consideration that 
would criminalize the display of sexually explicit images in cars. 141 
Whether the push for new laws to protect the unwilling listener or viewer 
will be more widespread is impossible to know at this point. From a 
normative perspective, however, it does seem rather incongruent for 
people to simultaneously disappear into personalized bubbles and at the 
same time demand legal protection from expression they do not wish to 
see or hear. 
Sex will not be the only speech thrust upon citizens in networked 
public places. The same basic calculus applies to aggressive advertising 
or what might be referred to as "public spamming." Pervasive computing 
will open up new possibilities for consumer targeting, including 
advertisements based upon the recipient's present geographical location. 
The environment itself will communicate offers to passersby. Many of 
these communications will be unwanted, in the sense that the recipient will 
not directly solicit them. 
Concerns about aggressive or manipulative advertising arise with each 
new generation of technologies. In the 1970s, for example, concerns were 
raised about Madison A venue tactics that might be subsumed under the 
137. 343 u.s. 451 (1952). 
138. See id. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
139. !d. at 469 (likening program to a form of mind control). 
140. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718(2000) (noting strong public interest in protecting 
repose of abortion clinic patrons). 
141. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN.§ 55-8-187 (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1077.01 
(West 2006). 
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heading "subliminal advertising."142 The email spam that stuffs our daily 
inboxes is only the latest example of commercial exploitation of new 
technologies. Public spamming would merely be the natural next 
generation of this phenomenon. 
The differences, however, between previous instances of aggressive 
advertising and what may become large-scale public spamming rest both 
on notions of place and technological self-help. Private spamming and 
harassing advertising are particularly troublesome because they invade the 
home. As noted, however, we enter the public sphere with a very limited 
expectation of privacy. In public places, we are already bombarded with 
commercial advertisements. As distasteful as some of these pleas are, as 
long as they are not false and misleading they are protected expression. 143 
Although their time, place, and manner of delivery can be regulated if 
sufficiently important reasons warrant, they cannot be prohibited. 144 Just 
as we daily exercise selective attention and memory to deal with those ads, 
so too will we have to learn to ignore digitally delivered ads while we are 
in public places. 
This assumes, of course, that the advertisements ever reach us. If we 
do not wish to receive them, we will presumably find a way to program 
our personal devices to filter them out. 145 Or we will walk away from the 
place that is facilitating the transmission. Or, if one can imagine such a 
thing, we will simply turn the device off. Increasingly the power of 
avoidance will lie precisely where the power of delivery does-in the 
technology we hold in our hands or wear on our bodies. 
The networking of public places will bring vast amounts of previously 
private expressive content into public view. Barring some rather serious 
doctrinal reconsideration, which at this point seems unlikely and probably 
in any event unnecessary, we will likely have to tolerate more offensive 
and aggressive forms of public expression in networked public places. 
Self-help, in terms of both social practices and technological solutions, 
will be the primary recourse when unwanted expression intrudes on the 
privacy and repose of unwilling audiences. 
142. See Nicole Grattan Pearson, Note, Subliminal Speech: Is It Worthy of First Amendment 
Protection?, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 775, 778 (1995); see also Olivia Goodkin & Maureen Ann 
Phillips, The Subconscious Taken Captive: A Social, Ethical, and Legal Analysis of Subliminal 
Communication Technology, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1077 (1980-81) (discussing the use of subliminal 
communication technology up until 1980). 
143. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
(holding that commercial speech is protected by First Amendment). 
144. /d. at 771. 
145. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 1 07 (2003) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, 
DISSENT] (discussing private programming of communications technologies to cater to personal 
interests). 
2007] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NETWORKED PUBUC PLACES 
C. Protection: Dangerous, Offensive, and Harmful 
Speech Activity 
31 
Public captivity raises an even larger concern with respect to the 
presence of harmful or dangerous speech in networked public places. As 
noted in Part IT, in material public places expression-and its 
regulation-tends to be tangible and physical. Assuming some minimill 
advance notice, a listener or viewer can generally avoid speech by 
avoiding the speaker, or the place. The tangibility and visibility of 
expression in material places also facilitates its official regulation. 
Doctrines like true threats, fighting words, harassment, and incitement are 
based on a material model of public places and public expression. 
Expression in networked public places is already beginning to lose its 
tangible and physical characteristics. What protection will there be for 
audiences, and the public at large, from harmful expression in networked 
public places that is digitally conveyed? 
New technologies invariably give rise to new forms of annoying and 
harassing expressive behavior. There may in fact tum out to be a number 
of annoying and embarrassing applications of new technologies in 
networked public places. For example, there have been public voyeurism 
issues related to recent uses of personal cameras in public places. 146 Today 
it is relatively easy to take a photograph of a person in public, perhaps 
doctor the image in any number of ways, and post it immediately on a 
website for all to see. Soon a single device like a cell phone will serve all 
of these purposes at once. 
More seriously, in networked public places it may soon be possible to 
approach a recipient virtually, perhaps anonymously. Devices will 
"introduce" themselves to other nearby devices. 147 This type of 
communication, along with public spamming, may introduce new forms 
of harmful speech. We may encounter an updated virtual version of the 
sidewalk harassment that occurs with disturbing frequency in material 
public places. 148 The public audience may also be vulnerable to an even 
more pernicious form of harassment that we might call "public cyber-
stalking."149 This is not, admittedly, a current problem, in part owing to 
146. See H. Koskela, Video Surveillance, Gender and the Safety of Public Urban Space: 
"Peeping Tom" Goes High Tech?, 23 URBAN GEOGRAPHY 257,257-78 (2002). 
14 7. For example, r~cently launched Bluetooth technology called "Proxidating" notifies a user 
when a potentially compatible mate is nearby. See Proxidating, The First Ever Bluetooth Proximity 
Dating Software, http://www.proxidating.com/index.php?code_pays=US (last visited Sept. 24, 
2006) ("Imagine, you are crossing the street when the girUboy of your dreams passes before you, 
your phone buzzes and their face appears on your phone's screen .... "). 
148. For a recent analysis of sidewalk harassment, see LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO 
HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE PUBLIC SPEECH (2004). 
149. Cyber-stalking is the use of communications devices to stalk another. See U.S. DEP'T OF 
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Americans' relative slowness in adopting new peer-to-peer technologies. 150 
But consider that a mere decade ago, few had even heard of cyber-
stalking. As a result of some pervasive online misconduct, today many 
states have laws that purport to protect unwilling recipients from 
harassing, annoying, and even embarrassing online communications. 151 
What, if any, protection can or should these or other laws provide from 
new forms of harmful expression produced by and in networked public 
places?152 
There are obvious constitutional problems with protecting any of us 
from merely annoying or embarrassing expression, as some cyber-stalking 
laws purport to do. 153 The networked public environment will often be an 
annoying place to be. Opportunities for public embarrassment will rise as 
cameras capture public events. But assuming the communication is 
delivered through an online medium, with the requisite intent and the 
effect of causing a reasonable fear of harm, existing statutes would appear 
to protect the victim of public cyber-stalking. There is no reason to limit 
application of these statutes to instances in which the victim is in the home 
or workplace when she receives the communications. The harm is the 
psychological damage the fear engenders, and that fear may be even 
greater in an open public place where the victim may be more physically 
exposed and vulnerable. So long as the victim knows or reasonably fears 
she is being stalked, the statutes should apply. 154 
The concerns with public cyber-stalking are ultimately not legal, but 
pragmatic ones. Even with ubiquitous CCTV and other forms of 
surveillance, the likelihood of real-time official intervention is quite slim. 
Technological advances are also making proof of these offenses 
JUSTICE, 1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
INDUSTRY, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm. 
150. Americans have been less apt to adopt peer-to-peer technologies like Bluetooth systems 
than, say, Japanese citizens. But if the cost of these technologies decreases, as expected, we may 
see substantial changes in communicative habits in public places. See RHEINGOID, supra note 87, 
at 22-24 (discussing economic and cultural influences). 
151. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener's Perspective: 
Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377 
(describing and analyzing cyber-stalking laws). 
152. Connectivity has created difficulties in the workplace as well. See David T. Bower, Note, 
Make It Stop or I'll Sue!: The Feasibility of a Hostile Work Environment Claim Created by Sexually 
Explicit Spam, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1577 (2005) (noting the rising problem of sexually explicit 
workplace spam). 
153. See Volokh, supra note 151, at425-35 (discussing vagueness and overbreadth problems 
with many cyber-stalking laws); see also Joshua Azriel, First Amendment Implications for E-mail 
Threats: Are There Any Free Speech Protections?, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 845 
(2005) (discussing First Amendment implications of regulating email threats). 
154. See Frazier v. Delco Elecs. Corp., 263 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The stalking 
victim who doesn't know that she is being stalked is not in fear of being injured."). 
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increasingly difficult. A sustained stream of communication to one's home 
or work computer may produce a record of evidence sufficient to identify, 
arrest, and prosecute a wrongdoer. But a quickly delivered and perhaps 
encrypted strike in a public place, or even a series ofthem, will be difficult 
to trace, track, and police. Now add one more twist to our public cyber-
stalking scenario. It is currently possible to send self-destructing virtual 
communications-messages that explode and essentially disappear shortly 
after they are received. 155 Under these circumstances, proof and 
prosecution under threat or other safety laws will be most difficult if not 
altogether impossible. 
It would seem that, as in material places, the merely annoying and 
embarrassing will either have to be tolerated or policed by social norms 
and self-help mechanisms. The recipient or target of harassing expression 
in networked public places will have at her disposal substantial means of 
self-help. She might of course leave the park, mall, or other place. But as 
occurs in some traditional harassment and stalking situations, she may be 
followed. Or she may reset her device's receipt protocols to block any 
further messages from the particular speaker. This may be the best defense 
against at least some forms of public cyber-harassment. We should not, 
however, overlook the potential costs associated with this particular form 
of self-help. Taking the most extreme defensive stance, for example, 
people could effectively create a "white list" of other people from which 
they will accept messages in any public place. This would protect the 
listener from unwanted messages, but only by effectively isolating her 
from public communications she might have actually desired to receive. 
It would thus seem that, as in the case of public captivity, audiences 
will mostly have to resort to self-help and other private means of 
avoidance when confronted with harassing expression in networked public 
places. According to some recent studies, this is apparently the way that 
Americans would prefer things. Survey results indicate that in many cases 
the public seems to prefer that norms rather than laws be used to regulate 
problematic expression. 156 One would expect that if given the option, these 
respondents might also prefer technological solutions to legal ones. 
Virtual harassment and cyber-stalking are only two forms of harmful 
speech that may occur in networked public places. The examples 
demonstrate the common difficulty with protecting any of us from 
digitally conveyed expression in public places. Other dangerous or 
155. See Steve Ranger, This Text Will Self-Destrnct in 40 Seconds, SIUCON, Dec. 12, 2005, 
http://networks.silicon.com/mobile/0,39024665,39154995,00.htm (describing a service in which 
email self-destructs within forty seconds of receipt). 
156. See MARVIN AMMORI, THE INFO. SOC'Y PROJECT, YALE LAW SCH., PUBUC 0PIN10N AND 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 22 (2006), available at http://research.yale.edu/isp/papers/ 
ISP _PublicOpinion_fos.pdf. 
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harmful forms of expression, including "true threats" and "fighting 
words," raise similar issues of pragmatics and proof. 157 Virtual threats and 
fighting words will not generally be witnessed events, in the sense that no 
material manifestation of them will occur and no public audience will 
experience them. 
Moreover, these doctrines were developed with the imminence of real 
space and time in mind. Can one reasonably fear a threat delivered in a 
text message, with no further action taken? Can one invite a brawl through 
a text message?158 Ultimately, as was true when stalking went online, it 
may be necessary to rethink or perhaps redefine the elements of these 
content categories to fit the new circumstances of networked public places. 
Or, alternatively, the networking of public places may provide further 
evidence that these categories are unworkable in a modem world in which 
the forms and mechanisms of communication are rapidly changing. 
Nowhere are the effects of networking on space and time more likely 
to be felt than with regard to content in the category of "incitement to 
unlawful action."159 To constitute incitement, a communication must be 
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely 
to incite or produce such action. "160 What exactly does imminence indicate 
in networked public places? · 
The incitement doctrine, like many others, developed under conditions 
in which speakers and audiences were located in the same place. Wireless 
networking and pervasive computing erase spatial boundaries; these 
features can bring people together with remarkable speed and efficiency. 
As noted in Part IT, mobile computing devices have the potential to 
facilitate assembly and collective action. The dark side of this, of course, 
is the power these devices have to facilitate collective acts of terrorism or 
other violence. 161 
On one hand, most Internet communications would seem to fail the 
imminence test. Internet communications can certainly lead to punishment 
for threatening speech, at least where tangible physical harm actually 
157. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,364-66 (2003); Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568,572 (1942) (defining fighting words as those which ''tend to incite an immediate breach 
of the peace"). 
158. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 114 
(1980) (describing fighting words as a "quite unambiguous invitation to a brawl"); see also Sanjiv 
N. Singh, Cyberspace: A New Frontier For Fighting Words, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
283, 316-17 (1999) (examining psychological and physical injuries occasioned by online fighting 
words). 
159. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (footnote omitted). 
160. /d. 
161. For this reason officials must seriously consider whether providing wireless Web access 
on subway trains and other public facilities might facilitate future terrorist attacks. 
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occurs in material places. 162 But in terms of incitement in particular, the 
nature of Internet communications is such that words on the Web are not 
generally delivered instantaneously to the audience. 163 Here, however, is 
one place where the intersection of material and cyber places may matter. 
The requisite imminence and risk of action may not have been present 
where a potential lawbreaker, sitting at his desktop in a pre-networked 
environment, posted a message on a website encouraging the like-minded 
to "move on City Hall." But imminence and likelihood of harm may need 
to be calculated differently in a networked public environment. The 
networked speaker may be communicating from afar, while the threat on 
the ground from swarming and other coordinated activities may be both 
real and imminent. With constant accessibility to public Web access, co-
actors would have instantaneous access to the speaker's instructions and 
encouragements. Their mobility and access to shared information 
networks would significantly raise the risk of collective action. 
The line between incitement and mere encouragement has always been 
somewhat hazy. Recent terrorism prosecutions appear to be pushing the 
limits of the imminence requirement under Brandenburg's classic 
articulation ofthe incitement doctrine. 164 Suspects have been arrested prior 
to taking any substantial action toward perpetrating a crime, sometimes for 
little more than discussing their hatred for the United States or the 
possibility of some future attack. 165 New types of criminal activity like 
terrorism, coupled with new technologies like wireless networks and 
personal computing devices, need not necessarily change the definition of 
incitement. But they may well affect the delicate balance the doctrine 
requires officials and courts to maintain. The qualities of space and time, 
which help separate preemptive and illegitimate official acts and sanctions 
from lawful ones, will be less and less reliable indicators in networked 
places. Plausible arguments for stretching the scope of the imminence 
standard will arise as public places become networked. 
The imminent melding of cyberspaces and material spaces will raise 
fundamental questions about doctrines developed to police expression that 
has until now been mostly material, physical, and visible. Personally 
harassing and offensive expression will likely have to be dealt with 
162. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding damages award against organizations that 
published names, addresses, and other personal information relating to abortion providers on 
website). 
163. See John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework/or 
an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 425, 428-29 (2002) (noting "imminence" 
problem with regard to Internet communications). 
164. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
165. See Eric Lipton, Recent Arrests in Terror Plots Yield Debate on Pre-emptive Action by 
Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at All (reporting on recent terrorism plots and arrests). 
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through self-help mechanisms. Larger public safety threats may involve 
a reconsideration of concepts such as imminence and preemption. Policing 
incitements and threats that cannot be seen or heard will require ever more 
sophisticated surveillance capabilities and activities. As discussed below, 
this surveillance will raise substantial First Amendment concerns of its 
own. 
D. Protest: Assembly, Association, and Anticipatory Conformity 
Pervasive surveillance will make it possible for authorities to know of 
matters in advance, and thus to act preemptively. The technologies of 
surveillance are not only proliferating but becoming more and more 
powerful in terms of their capabilities. As a result we may no longer 
assume that we are blending into a public environment. Our activities, our 
associations, perhaps someday even our public thoughts may be 
discovered. 166 
Public surveillance raises Fourth Amendment privacy concems. 167 But 
there are serious First Amendment considerations as well. Depending on 
its ultimate form and scope, public surveillance may have substantial 
adverse effects on public expressive liberties. In terms of public expressive 
displays like protests and demonstrations, two general burdens will likely 
be imposed. First, there may be a chilling of associative rights. If 
assemblies are routinely watched and their activities recorded, it may be 
that speakers will be less likely to join in certain public causes. Second, 
there may be a chilling of expressive behavior. Sociologists, philosophers, 
and legal theorists have examined the phenomenon of "anticipatory 
conformity," in which actors engage in self-restraining behavior when they 
believe they are being watched. 168 Given the nature of their expressive 
repertoires, political activists and other dissenters may disproportionately 
experience these effects. 
Some have suggested that the mere existence of public surveillance 
cameras may violate the First Amendment. 169 Under current doctrine, 
however, there are substantial obstacles to such a claim. The most 
166. If we follow the course taken by Great Britain, then it will one day be unusual not to have 
our public activities recorded. See CUVE NORRIS & GARY ARMSTRONG, THE MAXIMUM 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CCTV 42 (1999) (estimating that more than 300 cameras 
may film an individual in Britain each day). 
167. Blitz, supra note 6, at 683. See generally Slobogin, supra note 5 (arguing that the Fourth 
Amendment requires regulation of public surveillance). 
168. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 242-44 (discussing research on anticipatory conformity). 
169. See Blitz, supra note 6, at 696-98 (noting chilling effect on public urban speech activities 
and loss of anonymity); Slobogin, supra note 5, at 252-53 ("[O]ne might argue for a First 
Amendment right to be free of the inhibiting effects of camera surveillance in public unless the 
government can proffer some justification for it."). 
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significant obstacle to a First Amendment claim based on the mere 
existence of public surveillance is Laird v. Tatum. 110 In Tatum, the 
Supreme Court held that a challenge to an Army covert surveillance 
program that tracked the activities of certain civil rights protest groups 
raised a non-justiciable controversy. 171 The surveillance program's 
existence was not in dispute. 172 But none of the alleged victims could 
demonstrate that they had suffered any cognizable injury as a result of 
being watched. 173 The Court acknowledged that a First Amendment 
violation might arise from something short of a direct prohibition on the 
exercise ofFirst Amendment rights. 174 But the "chilling" effect recognized 
in prior cases, the Court said, involved exercises of governmental power 
that were "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the 
complainant · was either presently or prospectively subject to the 
regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that [the individual] was 
challenging."175 
Tatum suggests that any broadside by political groups or activists 
against general public surveillance programs is likely to fail. 176 In Tatum, 
authorities were attending public meetings and gathering information from 
news accounts. 177 Only the means of collecting information has changed. 
As in Tatum, only public information is being collected under known 
official surveillance programs. Of course, more serious concerns might be 
raised if specific groups or individuals were somehow targeted for public 
surveillance without sufficient cause. 178 The result might also be different 
if authorities were some day to link features of the network to access 
private Web or other electronic information about persons or groups who 
are gathering in public. 
The mere existence of surveillance cameras situated in public places, 
however, would not seem to surpass Tatum's jurisdictional hurdle, much 
less demonstrate a First Amendment violation. This will likely remain the 
170. 408 u.s. l (1972). 
171. /d. at 13-15. 
172. See id. at 8. 
173. /d.atl3-l4. 
174. /d. at ll. 
175. /d. 
176. Federal appeals courts have rejected several attacks on public surveillance programs 
based on Tatum. See, e.g., Phila. Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends v. Tate, 519 
F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir. 1975); Socialist Workers Partyv. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 510 F.2d 
253, 255-57 (2d Cir. 1974). 
177. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 6. 
178. See Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 583, 585 (lOth Cir. 1990) 
(distinguishing Tatum where protesters alleged that targeted surveillance caused harm to 
reputation); see also Slobogin, supra note 5, at 255-56 (noting that some courts have distinguished 
Tatum where targeted surveillance affects membership or other specific group activities). 
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case so long as courts continue to view the harm or injury from pervasive 
surveillance as minimal and, what is more important, non-regulatory. 
It is not difficult to imagine that pervasive surveillance at places like 
the National Mall may have serious chilling effects on public protest 
activity, both in terms of limiting associations and encouraging the 
anticipatory conformity of public expressive behavior. The same effect 
might be imagined in public squares and parks across the country. But 
imaginings are not concrete harms. What is required-if plaintiffs are to 
remain in court, and have a chance of success-is a much stronger 
showing that such chilling effects actually exist. 179 
As the technologies of surveillance become more sophisticated, 
research on their expressive effects must keep pace. There is already a 
body of research examining the societal effects of pervasive surveillance. 
Many criminologists, urban geographers, and sociologists have concluded 
that public surveillance (a) does not serve to reduce crime, (b) excludes 
certain populations from public areas, and (c) reduces tolerance for 
"difference," including unconventional (but not illegal) behavior. 180 These 
findings and conclusions raise substantial First Amendment concerns. At 
this point, however, there is insufficient research to convincingly 
demonstrate that constant surveillance amounts to a form of regulatory 
harm. It must be shown that the networked environment actually prevents 
or substantially discourages speakers and assemblies from engaging in 
public expressive activities. Even with such a showing, however, the 
government's response will likely be that the threat of terrorism and other 
criminal activity is a compelling reason to put public areas under 
surveillance. Indeed, that concern has already caused some courts to 
loosen restrictions on political surveillance. 181 
There is little doubt that pervasive public surveillance will affect the 
exercise of public liberties. The present challenge is to demonstrate these 
effects concretely, in a manner that satisfies Tatum. We have a 
sociological expectation of blending in and avoiding constant scrutiny 
while in public places. Right now, however, we have no enforceable legal 
or constitutional right of this sort. 
E. Privacy: Identity, Thought, and Compulsory Speech 
Political activists and protesters will have a difficult time convincing 
courts of their right to avoid public scrutiny. What about the public 
179. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 245-46 (noting only a "small amount" of evidence has thus 
far been generated to prove the effect). 
180. See id. at 248-49. 
181. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(removing some restrictions on surveillance); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (removing some restrictions on surveillance). 
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solicitor, pamphleteer, or solitary speaker? A speaker's right to 
communicate anonymously in public may be compromised by identity-
exposing surveillance. Network-facilitated intrusions may someday make 
it possible for authorities to know a person's thoughts, for example by 
knowing what websites she has visited while in public areas or even, as 
technology becomes more sophisticated, by reading her face. Digitized 
environments may compel speakers to announce their identities and other 
information. Will any of these things violate the First Amendment? 
Protection of one's identity is an aspect of the First Amendment's 
privacy guarantee. Recall that in Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission, 182 the Supreme Court held that there was at least a limited 
right to communicate anonymously. 183 Given the power of today's 
surveillance technologies, it is certainly conceivable that in the future the 
right to anonymous pamphleteering could be violated in several ways. 
Cameras might reveal personal identifying information from distances of 
hundreds offeet. 184 As it develops, facial recognition technology may also 
reveal one's identity to authorities. In a future public environment, a 
speaker may be forced somehow to authenticate himself-by digital tags 
on his person or objects-before being permitted to enter a particular 
public place. 
All of these things would disclose a person's identity to authorities, at 
times while she is engaged in protected speech. But Mcintyre would only 
seem to protect identity in the hypothetical case of the exposed 
pamphleteer. The decision does not protect any generalized right of 
speakers to disguise or conceal their identities while in public. 185 Rather, 
it protects the right to publish one's views anonymously. 186 Identity is 
protected, in other words, not for its own sake but in connection with the 
act of publishing some message or view of the author. The author wishes 
to publish those views in such a manner that viewers remain unaware of 
her identity, whether for fear of reprisals or for expressive effect. 187 
182. 514 u.s. 334 (1995). 
183. !d. at 357; cf Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y ofN.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 
U.S. 150, 169 (2002) (invalidating ordinance that required door-to-door solicitors to disclose their 
identity). 
184. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 222. 
185. See, e.g., Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik. 356 F.3d 197,211 
(2d Cir. 2004) (upholding New York's ban on wearing masks in public places). 
186. See Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 342 ("The freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond 
the literary realm."). 
187. See id. at 341-42. For these same reasons, courts have protected the rights oflntemet 
speakers to maintain anonymity in connection with the publication of their views. See Blitz, supra 
note 6, at 704-05 (discussing cases and drawing analogy between public space anonymity and 
Internet anonymity); see also Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? Mcintyre and the 
Internet, 75 OR. L. REv. 117 (1996) (discussing cases that support giving First Amendment 
protection to online anonymous speech). 
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As long as governments do not regulate identity by prohibiting 
dissemination of anonymous messages, Mcintyre would appear to provide 
no relief to those whose identity is merely exposed as a result of public 
surveillance. This does not mean that the loss of anonymity will have no 
effect on public expression and public life more generally. At this point in 
time, however, First Amendment conceptions of privacy do not encompass 
a general right to conceal one's identity while in public places. 
More disturbingly, the networking of public places may also someday 
make it possible for authorities to intrude on the private thoughts of 
citizens. The First Amendment protects a private realm of thought, 
including what books we read, what websites we choose to visit, and what 
beliefs we hold. 188 Certain networking features will implicate this aspect 
of expressive privacy. 
Municipal involvement in the operation of public WiFi systems may 
endanger this aspect of First Amendment privacy. Again, the experience 
of public libraries that provide Web access may provide some insight. 
Librarians have been vigorously resisting official requests made under the 
USA PATRIOT Actl89 for patron library records. 190 The librarians have 
been defending their patrons' right to access information without fear of 
governmental surveillance of their reading habits. They seek to protect 
patrons' First Amendment rights to free inquiry and thought. 191 
The libraries are well positioned, institutionally and as· a matter oftheir 
basic mission, to resist such requests. Suppose, however, that a 
municipality providing or partnering with an Internet Service Provider to 
provide public WiFi receives credible information concerning a terrorist 
organization or an individual believed to be implicated in a terrorist plot. 
If the municipality is the sole provider of wireless Internet access, what 
will prevent it from monitoring or accessing the records of that 
organization or person? If it is providing access in partnership with a 
private service provider, will the provider feel pressured to turn over such 
information-in some cases without a subpoena? Ifthe Web constitutes 
a "library" of information, records of what one is searching ought to be 
protected regardless of the place in which the search occurs-in the home, 
188. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 4 79, 482 ( 1965) ("The right of freedom of speech 
and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to 
receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought .... ") (internal citations 
omitted). 
189. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of2001, 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-Sd (West 2006). 
190. See, e.g., Alison Leigh Cowan, U.S. Ends a Yearlong Effort to Obtain Library Records 
Amid Secrecy in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2006, at 86. 
191. See id. 
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in a library, or on a public bench. 
A more literal interference with private thoughts may occur in fully 
networked public places. The First Amendment does not permit 
governments to punish anyone for merely thinking bad thoughts. 192 Next 
generation facial recognition programs may offer a window into a person's 
private thoughts. Facial recognition software, which has been used at 
major sporting and other public events, maps the details and ratios of 
facial geometry using certain algorithms. 193 The most prevalent of these is 
the "eigenface," which is composed of "eigenvalues."194 The current 
technology has substantial error rates. 195 But future generations of this 
technology will no doubt be more accurate in identifying individuals and 
reading their faces. 
Suppose the technology existed to permit officials to canvass a crowd, 
focus on a specific person identified as a potential threat of whatever 
nature, and calculate his eigenvalues. To make the matter more concrete, 
suppose a paroled child predator appears at a public park where several 
children are playing. 196 Suppose further that the predator has done nothing 
in terms of approaching the children or otherwise acting on whatever 
impulses he may have. But his eigenvalues, captured on a public 
surveillance camera, reveal that he is so inclined. 197 
Is there a basis for preemptively arresting the predator if these 
measures strongly indicate some fantasy or other invidious proclivity 
toward the children in the park?198 Under current doctrine the answer 
would appear to be no. 199 The predator may be arrested for the acts he 
commits while in a public place, but not for what he merely happens to be 
192. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992)(invalidating ordinance that 
purported to punish racist thoughts); Stanleyv. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (noting that the 
state "cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private 
thoughts"). 
193. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Face Recognition, http://www.epic.org/privacy/ 
facerecognition (last visited Oct. 4, 2006). 
194. See ANDREA SELINGER & DIEGO A. SOCOLINSKY, APPEARANCE-BASED FACIAL 
RECOGNITION USING VISIBLE AND THERMAL IMAGERY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 8 (2002), available 
at http://www.equinoxsensors.com/publications/andreas_face.pdf. 
195. See DUANE M. BLACKBURN ET AL., FACIAL RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST 2000 
EVALUATIONREPORT14-22(Feb.l6,2001),avai/ab/eathttp://www.frvt.org/dls/FRVT_2000.pdf. 
196. The hypothetical is based on the facts of Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757,759-60 
(7th Cir. 2004). 
197. Malcolm Gladwell has provided an account of the work of psychologist Paul Ekman 
regarding facial signaling. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Naked Face: Can You Read People's 
Thoughts Just by Looking at Them?, NEW YORKER, Aug. 5, 2002, at 38, available at 
http://www.gladwell.com/2002/2002_08_05_a_face.htm. 
198. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67-68 (l973)("The fantasies of a drug 
addict are his own and beyond the reach of government .... "). 
199. See id. 
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thinking while there. Until now this matter has not been one of serious 
concern. Governments, after all, cannot read citizens' minds. But as one 
commentator has noted: "Current research blurs the boundary between 
biometrics and mind reading."200 Like our identities, our thoughts may be 
exposed in future networked environments. Technology will make 
thoughts more and more accessible to authorities. 
Finally, speakers in networked public places may often be compelled 
to speak in the sense of identifying and authenticating themselves. 
Suppose, for example, that as a condition of access to some public place, 
the government requires that a machine must read a compulsory 
identification card. The First Amendment protects the right not to be 
compelled to express thoughts and beliefs against one's will. 201 The 
hypothetical compulsion here does not, however, compel the stating of any 
belief, creed, or thought. It is more akin to the sending of an administrative 
email, an act the Supreme Court recently found not to implicate the First 
Amendment's ban on compelled speech.202 Such a system would be more 
akin to regulating conduct-in this case entry-than speech, thought, or 
belief. 
The networking of public places will strain currently recognized rights 
to maintain speaker anonymity. It will facilitate the surveillance of records 
indicating private interests and preferences. It may ultimately expose the 
thoughts of public citizens. And it will compel authentication, perhaps 
constantly. Again, much will depend on how the technology develops and 
is used. The most that can be said at this point in time is that there are 
serious First Amendment privacy concerns lurking in the features of 
networked public places. Whether any of them will ripen into 
constitutional violations will ultimately depend on their sophistication and 
uses. 
F. Press: "Citizen-Journalists" and Disclosures of 
Private Information 
The networking of public places will also affect the reporting of news 
and the flow of information. These things are of course critical to core 
First Amendment values such as self-government and the search for truth. 
In the traditional model, news was gathered and disseminated by major 
200. Mitchell Gray, Urban Surveillance and Panopticism: Will We Recognize the Facial 
Recognition Society?, I SURVEILlANCE AND SOC'Y 314, 324 (2003), available at 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articlesl(3)/facial.pdf. 
201. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that the state could not compel 
citizens to display the state motto on license plates); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating compulsory flag salute for school children). 
202. See Rurnsfeld v. FAIR, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1308 (2006) (holding that compelling law 
schools to assist military employers with logistics of recruitment did not compel schools to speak). 
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news media outlets. Reporters at news desks and on the beat delivered 
information to a mostly passive public audience. Today, however, citizens 
have become increasingly involved in newsgathering and publishing. The 
Internet, of course, is the primary force behind this change. Weblogs at 
first supplemented and now appear to be displacing the traditional press 
as sources of information. The networking of public places will continue 
this trend. It will fill streets, parks, squares, and other public places with 
citizen-journalists. Citizen-journalists will be able to easily deliver the 
"live and on the scene" portion of the news that bloggers miss while at 
their desks. They will be able to go out in the "field," interview witnesses 
to events, and publish "reports" to an already growing number of Web 
clearinghouses. 203 
This trend toward citizen-journalism raises two important First 
Amendment issues. The first issue involves the very definition of "the 
press." There is at this moment a serious debate regarding whether those 
who contribute and post to Weblogs qualify as press under the First 
Amendment. 204 This question has some important pragmatic implications. 
For example, if they are members ofthe press, bloggers would presumably 
be entitled to whatever privilege for withholding confidential sources the 
mainstream press possesses.205 In broader terms, although the press has 
few special privileges under the First Amendment, its status presents 
special considerations with regard to such things as prior restraints and the 
application of general laws to press interests.206 If nothing else, the mantle 
of the press may cause courts to more carefully scrutinize the limits on 
information gathering and publishing by citizen-journalists. 
The Weblog now performs many of the same functions as major news 
media outlets in terms of informing the public, exposing governmental 
corruption, and providing public access to information on a broad array of 
issues of public concern. 207 Whether by serving these functions bloggers 
203. Of course, for these clearinghouses to become legitimate news sources there will have 
to be some means of measuring and ensuring accuracy and reputation. 
204. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter's Privilege, 92 MINN. 
L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (examining bloggers and other disseminators of information). 
205. But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655 (1972) (declining to explicitly recognize such 
a privilege). Many states have journalist shield laws. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b ). One court 
has recently held that a state law extends to Weblogs. See O'Grady v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara 
County, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that California journalist's privilege 
extends to Weblog). Courts could also create a journalist's privilege under the common law. See 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (declining to 
create a common-law journalist's privilege, in part owing to the difficulty of deciding whether 
bloggers and other citizen-journalists would be entitled to protection). 
206. See N.Y. Times Co. v. UnitedStates,403 U.S. 713, 714(197l)(percuriam)(invalidating 
injunction prohibiting publication of Pentagon Papers). 
207. See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect 
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are entitled to constitutional protection for sources or other press privileges 
is an interesting question.208 If they are, then one must ask whether "the 
press" continues to convey anything truly meaningful in constitutional 
terms. After all, as one commentator has said: "When everyone can be a 
member, the club can no longer promise special treatment."209 
The networking of public places will contribute to the blurring of the 
line between members of the public and members of the press. 
Sophisticated means of information gathering and publishing will be 
available to more and more citizens. Like bloggers, on-the-ground citizen-
journalists will likely claim First Amendment privileges and protections. 
In United States v. Wolf, a freelance journalist was jailed for refusing to 
turn over to a grand jury footage of a political protest in which anarchists 
were suspected of vandalizing a police car.210 The Ninth Circuit recently 
refused to recognize a journalist's privilege for withholding the video 
footage. 211 
Courts will increasingly be called upon in cases like Wolf to determine 
not only the scope of constitutional privileges but also the classes of 
persons entitled to claim them. If"the press" is to retain any constitutional 
meaning at all, then not every citizen armed with a recording device and 
an Internet connection can be considered a member. Among other things, 
the extent to which extending privileges and other protections to millions 
of citizen-journalists would undermine law enforcement interests surely 
counsels against expanding the definition too far. And the ordinary citizen 
is not likely to be cultivating sources to facilitate the flow of sensitive 
information. She is much more likely to be recording events as they occur 
on the ground. She will be subject to no editorial oversight or professional 
standards. 212 She will be primarily observing, with the additional and often 
merely incidental capabilities of recording and publishing. She will, in 
the Journalist's Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 Hous. L. REv. 1371, 1378 
(2003) (noting the merger of citizen and journalist functions). 
208. See, e.g., Laura Durity, Shielding Journalist- "Bioggers ": The Need to Protect 
Newsgathering Despite the Distribution Medium, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 11, ~ 36-38 (arguing 
in favor of functional definition of "journalist" that would cover "journalists who use blogs as a 
mere distribution device for their work"); see also Papandrea, supra note 204 (arguing that every 
person who disseminates information to the public should be presumptively entitled to invoke the 
reporter's privilege). 
209. Berger, supra note 207, at 1378. 
210. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, No. 06-90064 (N.D. Ca. July 21, 2006) 
(granting Order to Show Cause), available at http:/ /joshwolf.net/grandjury/NEW /osc-contempt.pdf; 
see also Bob Egelko, Camerman Jailed for Not Yielding Tape, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 2, 2006, at A1. 
211. See Wolfv. United States, No. 06-16403, 2006 WL 2631398, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 
2006) (upholding contempt citation). 
212. See Anne Flanagan, Blogging: A Journal Need Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 395, 415-17 (2006) (urging use of code of ethics as one standard 
for determining who qualifies as a "journalist"). 
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short, remain more citizen than journalist. 
The second First Amendment issue relates towhat all of these citizen-
journalists shall be permitted to report about. Some of what transpires in 
public places consists of private facts and moments. As discussed earlier, 
we expect, at least some of the time, to blend into public places. If we 
cannot, this may affect public expressive activities. The question here is 
whether there are any limits on fellow citizens' efforts to report and 
publish private facts in public settings. 
The Supreme Court has been highly protective of the right to publish 
information, so long as it is lawfully obtained and of some interest to the 
public. In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,213 the Court held that a newspaper could 
not be punished under state law for truthfully publishing the name of a 
rape victim it had obtained lawfully.214 Even this very personal fact was 
considered "newsworthy."215 
The constitutional standard announced in Florida Star is in conflict 
with the privacy tort known as "publicity given to private life."216 Indeed, 
as Justice White stated in his dissent in Florida Star, the decision 
effectively "obliterated" the tort.217 The standard of public significance or 
"newsworthiness" ultimately protects very little of our private lives from 
public disclosure. The standard is designed to permit the broadest 
gathering and dissemination of information. This is a salutary thing, of 
course, in terms of First Amendment values. Indeed, some have suggested 
that the public disclosure privacy tort is wholly at odds with these basic 
values.218 If the tort is interpreted too broadly, it will likely chill speech 
and thus interfere with the flow of information to the public. 
When everyone becomes a gatherer and disseminator of news, 
however, then everything becomes to some degree a matter of public 
significance. The networking of public places, which will be filled with 
citizen-journalists, will make us all increasingly newsworthy subjects.219 
If the tort of public disclosure of private facts was not already dead, then 
213. 491 u.s. 524 (1989). 
214. /d. at 541. 
215. /d. at 533. 
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 6520 (1977). 
217. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting). 
218. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELLL. REv. 291, 362 {1983) (arguing that the "private-facts tort" 
threatens to chill speech and should be abandoned). 
219. Politicians, who are already newsworthy subjects, are finding that the networking of 
public places is altering the political climate and public politicking. See Ryan Lizza, The You Tube 
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,2006, § 4, at I (discussing incident in which Senator George Allen, 
the Virginia Republican, was caught on tape at a campaign event using a racial slur; the video 
appeared on YouTube, a videosharing website). 
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the networking of public places will surely contribute to its passing. 220 
Citizen-journalists, like traditional reporters, will have few limits with 
regard to what is within their legitimate domain of reportage. This may 
further discourage, among other things, public expressive activity.221 
We may well wish to have some legal recourse in networked places 
crawling with camera-toting citizen-journalists. We certainly must expect 
to be observed in public. But that does not mean we expect that our every 
move will be recorded by citizen-journalists. 222 The threat of tort liability 
might preserve at least some measure of private, anonymous life in public 
places. To this end, Professor Andrew McClurg has suggested that the 
privacy torts be expanded to include some right to "public privacy."223 He 
argues that a tort action is needed for what he calls "public intrusions."224 
As support for the recognition of this tort, he cites two factors-an 
increasingly aggressive media and advances in video and other 
surveillance and recording technologies.225 
Although the matter is quite close, the First Amendment balance seems 
best struck in favor of recognizing such a tort. There must of course be 
protection for citizen-journalists' gathering and disseminating of matters 
oflegitimate public interest.226 As noted earlier, protesters who videotape 
public events can effectively challenge official accounts of these events. 
But when the matter recorded and published is one of wholly private 
interest-who one embraces, or meets with, or what books or magazines 
one reads, for example-then there should be some protection against 
intrusion even if the activity occurs in public. Taking the larger First 
Amendment view, such protection will help to ensure that there is 
continued presence in and use of public places. There are already many 
factors that work against this presence and use, including pervasive official 
surveillance programs.227 Citizen-journalists should not be permitted to 
contribute to these constraints by indiscriminately recording and 
220. For an argument that the tort was never terribly effective at protecting private 
information, see Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy 
Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 887, 903-04 (2006). 
221. See supra notes 166-81 and accompanying text. 
222. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. C (discussing highly offensive 
publicity and noting that a citizen must tolerate "more or less casual observation"); id. illus. 10 ("A 
publishes, without B's consent, a picture of B nursing her child. This is an invasion of B's 
privacy."); see also id. § 652B cmt. C, illus. 7 (describing the publication of a young woman's 
picture, taken at a public "Fun House," showing her skirt over her head, as an invasion of privacy). 
223. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of 
Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REv. 989, 1055 (1995) (proposing adoption of 
tort of public intrusion on privacy). 
224. See id. at 1010-25. 
225. See id. 
226. See id. at 1082-85 (discussing public interest factor). 
227. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing pervasive official surveillance). 
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publishing private moments in public places that are not newsworthy. 
The First Amendment effects produced by the networking of public 
places will be both wide and deep. Even the ongoing controversy over who 
constitutes "the press" will be affected to some degree. Pervasive 
computing and constantly available Web access will turn everyone into a 
potential citizen-journalist capable of filing reports from the "field." We 
ought to ensure that when all of this taping and recording captures private 
moments and events, there will be some recourse in tort law. The First 
Amendment interests in continued use of public places outweigh the right 
of the citizen-journalists to "report" news that is of no legitimate public 
interest. 
IV. NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 
Although it is important to consider the effect networked places may 
have on individual and collective First Amendment rights, there are much 
larger issues lurking in the steady progression toward networked public 
places. As Professor Julie Cohen recently reminded us, cyberspace and 
other technologies do not exist or operate in a spatial vacuum. 228 These 
things affect the lived, embodied spaces of real people. 229 Professor Cohen 
is surely correct that "[c]yberspace is part of lived space."230 As the 
foregoing discussion shows, this is now quite literally true. Clouds, 
cameras, and computers are altering the public expressive environment. 
They are affecting how we interact, who we interact with, and what 
information is at hand as we live and experience public places. 
Networking will bring fundamental changes to urban and suburban 
landscapes. We must assess not only expressive rights, but expressive 
values as well. We must ask what sort of lived spaces networked places 
will ultimately be.231 What effect will spatial networking have on the 
ability of public places to serve critical First Amendment values, such as 
those related to self-government? To examine this impact effectively we 
must consult the work of geographers and sociologists as well as 
constitutional scholars. Although it is too infrequently acknowledged, 
what these other disciplines have to say about public places is central to 
the constitutional considerations at hand. 
228. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 3-4 (asserting that theories of cyberspace must take into 
account the "situated experience of cyberspace users and the complex interplay between real and 
digital geographies"). 
229. /d. at 4. 
230. /d. 
231. See Blitz, supra note 6, at 682 (noting that surveillance of urban spaces may transform 
cities into small towns); Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 119 ("As we percolate the physical 
environment, we intentionally or inadvertently redesign the public sphere. In doing so, we will 
either catalyze or inhibit its primary functions."). 
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A. Public Places and the Public Sphere 
An initial point of clarification is necessary. In determining what effect 
networking will have on public expressive life, we must concretize matters 
by clarifying the relevant places under consideration. "Public places" is a 
phrase that obviously denotes a large geographic canvas. This Article has 
been concerned with public expressive places in the broadest sense, from 
sidewalks to malls to street comers. These places make up what I have 
elsewhere referred to as an "expressive topography"-the public space 
potentially available for expressive activities. 232 These places are all to one 
degree or another becoming networked places. 
My use of "public place" is narrower than the concept of the "public 
sphere."233 Professors Kang and Cuff have analyzed the effect of one 
particular aspect of the networked environment-pervasive 
computing--on the public sphere.234 As they conceive it, this sphere 
"connotes the comprehensive intermingling of spatial and social 
terrains. "235 The public sphere, they say, is an open space of interaction 
and exchange, a shared space separate from the "intimate, protected, and 
familiar" private sphere. 236 This sphere is much broader than public places. 
Indeed, Kang and Cuff note that the public sphere extends to such places 
as movie theatres, laundromats, even tra.fficjams.231 
To analyze the effects of pervasive computing on the public sphere, 
Professors Kang and Cuff chose as their paradigmatic spatial example the 
shopping mall, a place that illustratively and effectively combines 
elements of community and commerce. 238 They appear to have chosen the 
mall for two general reasons. First, they note that "in many urban 
environments, malls are arguably what our public spaces have become. "239 
This is unfortunately true, insofar as public places now facilitate 
commerce more than any other form of interaction. Second, the mall was 
chosen as a paradigm because it is a place where people can generally be 
found. As Kang and Cuff say, their aim was to be "practical and look at 
the spaces where people actually are, not where academics long for them 
to be."240 
232. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 33, at 440. 
233. See generally RICHARD SENNETI, THE FALL OF PUBUC MAN ( 1976) (discussing concept 
of the public sphere). 
234. Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 116. 
235. !d. 
236. !d. 
237. !d. at 116-18 (discussing the "public sphere"). 
238. /d. at 119 (adopting the shopping mall as the relevant application). 
239. !d. 
240. !d. at 120; see, e.g., Jennifer Niles Coffin, Note, The United Mall of America: Free 
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The focus on the public sphere generally, and the mall in particular, is 
both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad if one is asking, as this 
Article does, what effect spatial networking will have on expressive 
values. Many ofthe places in the public sphere, including laundromats and 
traffic jams, have no connection at all to such values. Malls as a class of 
property are not presently considered expressive fora. 241 The shopping 
mall in particular is an example of what I have elsewhere called, 
borrowing a term from geographers, an expressive "non-place"-a space 
where expressive culture is discouraged or prevented from developing.242 
To be sure, as Kang and Cuff note, urban social critics have long lamented 
the "mailing" of public place.243 But to an extent this begs the question: 
What functions ought our public places serve? As well, whether or not 
academics wish it so, people in fact do remain on the streets, in the parks, 
and in public squares. They continue to rely on these places, and others, 
to exercise public expressive liberties. We ought to ask how networking 
technologies will affect expressive activity in such places. 
The paradigm we should adopt in order to address expressive values is 
not a mall, but something more akin to the '(National) Mall.244 For 
purposes of the discussion that follows, let us take as our paradigm place 
not the shopping mall but the public park or public square. These are the 
sorts of places that are most critical in terms of engendering civic 
republicanism and a sense of democratic community.245 
What speech activity will occur or be possible in these places once they 
become networked? Who will actively participate, and by what means? 
How democratic and facilitative of self-government will networked public 
places actually be? What steps might be taken to ensure that public 
Speech, State Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private Property, 33 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 615, 617-18 (2000) (noting the multiple functions of the modem shopping mall). 
241. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (holding that labor picketers had no right 
to demonstrate at a shopping center); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (holding 
that protestors of the Vietnam War had no right to distribute handbills in shopping center). 
242. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 33, at 480 (discussing mall spaces as part 
of the expressive topography). As Kang and Cuff note, in the mall "(p]eople-watching, not self-
governance, may be what is on the agenda." Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 117 (footnote omitted). 
243. See, e.g., Margaret Crawford, The World in a Shopping Mall, in V ARIATIONSONA THEME 
PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBUC SPACE 3 (Michael Sorkin ed., 1992). 
244. Kang and Cuff would no doubt object that theirs is the more practical paradigm, because 
they "look at the spaces where people actually are, not where academics long for them to be." Kang 
& Cuff, supra note 4, at 120. But people definitely remain on the streets, in the parks, and in public 
squares. They go to these places, and others, to exercise public expressive liberties. That they may 
do so less often than they go to a shopping mall is beside the point. It may beg the question whether 
public spaces that were more conducive to expression would be less sparsely populated. 
245. See MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBUC 
PHILOSOPHY 335-36 (1996) (commenting on the connection between New Urbanism projects 
focusing on the centrality of public places, community, and civic republicanism). 
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expressive values will endure in the public places of the future? To answer 
these questions we must first have a better sense of the expressive 
functions that public places ideally might serve.246 
B. The Democratic Functions of Public Places 
Public places substantially influence the nature and character of public 
citizenship.247 Their architectures (material and otherwise), the degree of 
freedom of access to them, and the nature of public interaction within 
them, mark the boundaries of our public liberties. To the extent that our 
public places are open and vibrant, they have the capacity to facilitate 
citizens' claims to identity, create breathing space for democratic 
participation and self-governance, and lend transparency to public 
expression and democratic governance. To the extent that use of such 
places is discouraged by spatial networking, these critical democratic 
functions are diminished. To be quite clear, what follows is very much a 
description of an ideal state of affairs. I do not contend that parks, squares, 
and other expressive places currently serve the highlighted functions, or 
even that they serve them very well. My general point is that we should 
not build a networked environment that further undermines these 
functions. 
1. Place and Identity 
Democratic citizenship involves living among others in a polity. 
Regardless of how often we may retreat to private enclaves, citizenship 
still requires some degree of public presence. As geographers have noted, 
the presence of an individual or group in public places is itself a claim to 
acceptance.248 It is important that all citizens have an equal opportunity 
actively to participate in expressive activities in public places. 
Material public places, as noted in Part II, serve a leveling or 
equalizing function in this regard. The causes of "little people" find a 
voice there. 249 The recent nationwide immigrant protests made a 
246. I do not contend that public places currently serve these functions, nor that they do so 
effectively in most cases. I wish to inquire whether the networking of public places might further 
undermine these ideal functions, and if so, how. 
24 7. See Blitz, supra note 6, at 71 0-ll (discussing importance of urban places like parks and 
streets to First Amendment rights and public experience). 
248. See generally DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT 
FOR PUBUC SPACE (2003) (noting how presence in place constitutes a claim to acceptance as part 
of community); see also Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the 
Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBUC SPHERE 109, 109-42 
(Craig Calhoun ed., 1991) (noting that groups traditionally excluded from the public sphere formed 
counterpublics). 
249. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (referring to the common 
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quintessential identity claim in this fashion. 250 By assembling in the streets 
and expressing themselves there, immigrants communicated a clear 
message: "We are here, and we are not going anywhere." Their 
demonstrations and other activities sparked a national conversation about 
the nation's immigration policies. 251 The situation bears some resemblance 
to the identity claims civil rights protesters made in the 1960s when they 
took to the streets, occupied public buildings, and staged sit-ins. They too 
were arguing for inclusion in a democratic community. Their very 
presence in public places symbolized their right to exist and to be counted 
as members of the polity. 
If access to public places indicates acceptance, then exclusion or 
substantial displacement conveys denial of one's public identity. This is 
sometimes a matter of social justice, as when the poor and homeless are 
ejected from substantial urban areas or harassed through aggressive 
enforcement of vagrancy laws.252 Unfortunately, class biases persist in 
today's public square. Officials can be overzealous in their efforts to 
preserve public norms of order and tranquility. For example, a federal 
appeals court recently invalidated a Los Angeles law permitting the arrest 
and conviction of the homeless for merely being-standing, sitting, or 
sleeping-in certain public places.253 The court held, in essence, that 
authorities cannot simply ban the public existence of an entire class of 
people.254 
Public places are symbolic of equality, acceptance, and political 
community. They are open to all on an equal basis, regardless of social or 
economic class. To exclude someone, either directly or indirectly, from 
participation in public life is a derogation of a fundamental claim to public 
identity. Many forces negatively affect public claims of civic identity. 
Among these are the increasing trend toward privatization of public 
places, gender- and race-based public harassment, and a variety of legal 
regulations of the places where expression may occur.255 We must ask 
what further impact the networking of public places might have on public 
presence, participation, and identity claims. 
people as "little people"). 
250. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, After Immigration Protests, Goal Remains Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 3, 2006, at AI (describing protests and recent social activism of immigrants). 
251. See id. 
252. For a thorough examination of the social justice implications of access to public places, 
particularly claims of the homeless, see generally MITCHELL, supra note 248. 
253. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (invalidating 
ordinance on Eighth Amendment grounds). 
254. /d. 
255. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 7, at 598-604; Zick, Space, Place, and 
Speech, supra note 33, at 442,497. 
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2. Place and Self-Governance 
In addition to facilitating identity claims, public places serve 
fundamental self-governance functions. 256 They provide critical breathing 
room in which speakers can approach, speak to, and attempt to persuade 
audiences.257 In the material marketplace conversations with other public 
citizens take place, petitions are signed, leaflets and pamphlets are 
distributed, signs are carried and posted, parades and protests are staged. 
The people practice self-governance in public places. 
Consider a place like the National Mall. The Mall is a deeply inscribed 
public place-sacred ground, one might say, insofar as self-governance is 
concerned. The condition of this place matters deeply in terms of shared 
national First Amendment values. Traditionally, speakers and audiences 
have gathered here and in other public places with some confidence that 
authorities were not tracking their every movement and utterance. This 
created open space for protest and dissent. But in a broader sense it also 
created a setting for democratic participation of all sorts. Public places 
have traditionally been part of a democratic commons, not militarized 
grids under constant surveillance by public and private devices. 
It is not merely the character of these places but the manner in which 
people are able to interact while there that determines the scope of self-
governance. Fundamentally, self-governance requires that listeners hear 
and audiences see speakers who attempt to convey messages. One of the 
principal advantages of physically emplaced expression, as opposed to the 
many burgeoning forms of virtual communication, is its ability to jar an 
audience, to force it to heed the messenger (if not the message). Jehovah's 
Witnesses, labor activists, anti-war protesters, suffragists, feminists, and 
civil rights proponents have all relied on the tangibility and physicality of 
public places and public expression to further their causes. They have 
understood, as many still do, that effective speech sometimes entails 
256. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT 
14-16, 24-27 (1948) (elaborating a self-governance theory of expression); Kent Greenawalt, Free 
Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119 ( 1989) (discussing the idea of the "marketplace" and 
other free speech justifications). 
257. To be sure, some have long doubted the salience of outdoor expressive activities like 
protest, solicitation, and pamphleteering. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. 
REv. 781, 793-94 (1987) (arguing that the lack oflocality and economic realities undermines the 
effectiveness of traditional public expression). A massive societal centralization has undermined 
the formation of community and the local conditions under which public expression might thrive. 
See generally SANDEL, supra note 245, at 205-08. Legal limits often undermine public expression. 
And today communicative outlets continue to proliferate on the Web and elsewhere. Although each 
of these things no doubt affects the incidence and effectiveness of public expression, people 
continue to seek public expressive space for their causes. Even in the virtual era, or perhaps 
especially so, people seek the physical and tangible. 
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interfering with the settled expectations of the unwilling or undecided 
public audience. Public places cannot serve fundamental participatory 
functions unless these conditions can regularly be met. 
In addition to facilitating identity claims, public places are also 
pragmatic proving grounds for public speakers and audiences. They are, 
or at least have been, spaces for public interaction. Whether or not 
speakers have persuaded listeners, public places have provided them the 
opportunity to do so. Public self-governance depends upon the continued 
existence of such opportunities. 
3. Place and Transparency 
As noted in Part ll, one of the defining characteristics of expression in 
material public places is its visibility and transparency. Public places serve 
two critical transparency functions. They assist speakers in making 
identity claims and facilitate public participation and self-governance. 
First, because it takes place in the open, material public expression can 
be seen and heard by others occupying the same places. Unlike, say, 
lobbying and other forms of private attempts at political persuasion, public 
expression is part of a public record. The public audience can witness the 
speech of marginal groups. It can come to know and recognize a cause. 
The public can assess the look and feel of speakers. How disgruntled or 
angry is this group? Does it represent a potential threat to safety? Do I 
want to support its cause? For the speaker, public displays can attract 
media attention and public sympathy, expand participation in a movement 
or cause, and signal support for that cause to public officials.258 The 
transparency, or visibility, of public expression can create Rositive 
cascades in terms of public support, publicity, or policy change.2 9 
Second, official regulation of public expression has itselftended to be 
visible and transparent. As the recent controversy regarding the National 
Security Agency's wiretapping program demonstrates,260 the degree of 
regulatory transparency affects public perceptions of the legitimacy of 
government. Traditionally, in material public places we have been able to 
see the tactics police are using to restrict public speakers and public 
assemblies. The public becomes a witness to these things. We are thus in 
a position to determine for ourselves whether official tactics respect basic 
258. See, e.g., Susanne Lohmann, A Signaling Model of Competitive Political Pressures, 7 
ECON. & POL. 181 (1995) (analyzing policy impact of public protests on congressional voting). 
259. It can, of course, also create negative cascades, as when protests are violent or 
destructive. 
260. See John Markoff, Questions Raised for Phone Giants in Spy Data Furor, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 13, 2006, at Al, Al3 (reporting on fallout from domestic surveillance program). A district 
court recently invalidated the NSA surveillance program on First and Fourth Amendment grounds. 
See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
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civil liberties. Regulation of public places is among the very few instances 
in which transparency of this sort exists. 
A vast amount of expression has recently migrated to the Internet. As 
it continues to go there, concerns continue to arise with regard to the 
transparency of governmental efforts to monitor expression in cyber-
places. This is so because neither the speech on the Web nor its regulation 
is particularly transparent. The speech there is read and not witnessed and 
experienced by the public and the media. It is thus more critical than ever 
that we preserve public spaces that are both transparently experienced and 
regulated. 
C. The Networked Public Citizen 
The networking ·of public places will do more than raise some 
interesting First Amendment issues. It will substantially affect the First 
Amendment values that might ideally be served by public places. This 
section examines the effects networking will have on public expression 
and more generally, civic life, in public places. The final section offers 
some modest proposals that may help preserve the critical functions of 
public places. 
1. Populated Places and the Public Digital Divide 
Of course, public places cannot serve any particular function unless 
they are sufficiently visited and used. Until recently, maintaining network 
connectivity in public spaces faced substantial barriers. Online access was 
primarily available only in the private sphere. 
Municipal wireless projects will tum entire cities and regions into 
hotspots. Access to information and communications technologies will 
burgeon even in currently underserved rural areas, further reducing the 
digital divide. In vast urban and suburban areas, citizens will no longer be 
limited to private areas when they wish to access the Internet. Concepts 
like online and offiine will thus continue to lose relevance, at least for 
many citizens, as public places become networked. For those with access 
to the latest technologies, information will flow more freely everywhere. 
This networking may have the salutary effect of increasing Americans' 
use of public places. It will also likely increase their use of mobile 
technologies in those places.261 As some have noted, American citizens 
have been less likely than citizens in other countries to utilize mobile 
261. The public library experience is again somewhat analogous. The obvious concern of 
public libraries as we entered an information age was how to remain vibrant, or even relevant, 
places for the consumption of information now delivered over networks rather than on shelves. By 
providing Internet access, public libraries not only helped to close a digital divide, but they also 
ensured that the library would remain a critical community space. 
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communications technologies in public places. 262 One suspected reason for 
this cultural divide is that in this country we have vast areas of private 
space-in our homes, our workplaces, and elsewhere-in which to engage 
in expression and interaction. It may also be the case that until now, our 
public network connections have been too weak to support robust use of 
the latest technologies in public areas. As clouds appear and networks are 
strengthened, we may expect to see many people personally computing 
and communicating in public places. 
Those who study urban and suburban geographies might initially be 
encouraged by this prospect. Indeed, the basic agenda of "new urbanist" 
scholars and activists is to revive common spaces like parks and squares 
as centers of interaction and community-building.263 These theorists 
generally believe that by widening suburban sidewalks, planning 
communities around central public places, and cutting back single-use 
zoning, civic interaction can be greatly facilitated. 264 Widely available 
wireless connectivity may provide citizens with a reason to remain in 
public places. 
Of course, mere public presence is not the primary goal. New urbanists 
and other public place activists envision public places that promote 
encounters among citizens from different backgrounds, races, and 
ethnicities. 265 Public expression is most vibrant when a variety of speakers 
engage in a variety of speech forms. But this raises the question: Who will 
the networked public citizen be? And whose identity claims will be most 
fully on display in newly networked parks and squares? 
The networking of public places may have the unintended negative 
effect of creating new classes of haves and have-nots. A public digital 
divide may develop between technologically literate groups and the still 
publicly disconnected?66 The networked environment will become more 
and more facilitative of digital communication. Indeed, it may render 
access to digital technologies critical to public participation. Thus, public 
places may become more foreign and alienating locales for those unable 
to use the available, ubiquitous technologies. 
262. Cf. RHEINGOLD, supra note 87, at 157-58 (describing the Phillippines' smart mob's 
extensive use of mobile technology). 
263. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L.REv. 1047, 1089-94 
(1996) (describing in general terms new urbanism principles). 
264. /d. at I 092. 
265. Much of this agenda dates back to the 1960s, when activists like Jane Jacobs stressed the 
importance of architecture to urban communities. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE 
OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES ( 1993) (discussing architecture and its effect on urban communities). 
266. For the status of the digital divide in the United States, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION (2000), available at 
http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttnOO.pdf(discussing increasing digital divide even while Internet 
access rises). 
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Wireless clouds and pervasive personal computing may even alter the 
socially acceptable uses of public places. Publicly online citizens may seek 
to enforce a norm of quiet computing that suppresses noisier forms of 
expression available to still-offline citizens. If they cannot enforce that 
norm, there is a danger that public ''Netizens" may retreat back into their 
homes and other private spaces. 
The transition to networked public places may affect the democratic 
functioning of places in ways that are not immediately apparent. Constant 
connectivity may bring people into the public square. But not everyone 
will be able to participate equally. New digital divisions and contests over 
appropriate behavioral norms in networked places may arise. The still-
offline citizen may become further alienated, disengaged, and displaced 
in public, while the networked citizen's claims and displays may be 
increasingly privileged. 
2. The People-Disconnected 
Even if the people are drawn into public places, we must ask what sort 
of expressive activity will take place there. What sorts of claims, displays, 
and communication will occur? To serve identity, self-governance, and 
transparency functions, networked places must facilitate not only 
commercial and recreational interaction but more substantive public 
communication as well. But will they? 
As noted in Part ll, the networking of public places will provide greater 
opportunities for social networking.267 These networks will become more 
and more sophisticated. This should facilitate spontaneous assemblies in 
public places. Networked public assemblies, protests, and demonstrations 
should be smarter than ever before, at least for those with access to up-to-
date technologies. 
Even if this transpires, however, protests and demonstrations constitute 
only a small fraction of the public expressive culture. Ideally, public 
places ought to facilitate spontaneous interactions and speech claims of all 
sorts, everything from solicitation to petitioning to begging.268 Networked 
public places are not likely to do so, however. What we are more likely to 
see in networked public places is an increasingly disconnectedpopulace.269 
Among the connected, Web access carried over public networks on 
267. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text. 
268. See Blitz, supra note 6, at 686 (noting the particular importance of urban spaces to 
provide "opportunities for giving speeches to large crowds, for confronting strangers with ideas 
they may find unfamiliar or provocative, or for speaking or gathering information in the anonymity 
of the crowd"). 
269. See Kevin Robins, Foreclosing on the City? The Bad Idea of Virtual Urbanism, in 
TECHNOCITIES 34, 34-59 (John Downey & Jim McGuigan eds., 1999) (criticizing idea that one can 
restore a sense of community by building virtual communication networks). 
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pervasive mobile devices will increase the phenomenon known as "absent 
presence. "270 As sociologists and urban geographers have noted, people are 
becoming increasingly disconnected from events in material places.271 This 
distance has serious First Amendment implications in terms ofthe identity, 
self-governance, and transparency functions of public places. 
Networked public citizens, their eyes cast downward and ears filled 
with audio devices, may not see or hear messages other than those 
transmitted into their personal bubbles.272 They will not see, hear, or 
experience a range of identity claims. They will be more inclined-and 
more able-to simply ignore solicitors, proselytizers, beggars, and other 
marginalized speakers. In addition, self-governance requires exposure to 
speakers and messages one does not agree with and may even be initially 
unwilling to engage.273 But the networking of public places will decrease 
chance encounters with unwanted messages. 274 
Speech in networked public places will also be less and less 
transparent. Wireless clouds and pervasive personal computing in public 
places will affect the very aesthetics-the look, feel, and experience-of 
public expressive activity. Formerly private communication forms like 
email and text messaging will proliferate, while tangible and face-to-face 
communication will continue to fade from public venues. Networking 
features and practices will alter even the expressive noise of public 
places.275 Public parks and squares will resemble offices and other private 
spaces of work and recreation. 
The new urbanist philosophy suggests that if you build wider streets 
and more inviting spaces, people will come. 276 People may indeed populate 
270. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 36 (discussing absent presence, or what is sometimes referred 
to as "present absence"); see also Kenneth J. Gergen, The Challenge of Absent Presence, in 
PERPETUAL CONTACT: MOBILE COMMUNICATION, PRNATE TALK, PUBUC PERFORMANCE 227 
(James E. Katz & Mark A. Aakhus eds., 2002) (exploring "absent presence," especially in relation 
to communication technology). 
271. See generally ]AMES E. KATZ, MAGIC IN THE AiR: MOBILE COMMUNICATION AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF SociAL LIFE (2006) (examining effects of mobile and pervasive 
communications technology on daily interaction). 
272. Cass Sunstein has referred to the private filtering or narrow casting of information as the 
"Daily Me," a technological bubble that channels pre-selected content to the listener or viewer. See 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBUC.COM 7 (2001) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, REPUBUC.COM]. 
273. See generally SUNSTEIN, DISSENT, supra note 145, at 1-13 (describing how groups make 
better decisions when dissent and debate are present). 
274. See STEVENFLUSTY, BUILDING P ARANOJA: THE PROUFERATION OF INTERDICTORY SPACE 
AND THE EROSIONOFSPATIALJUSTICE 12 (1994) (noting importance of chance encounters to civic 
life). 
275. See MICHAEL BULL, SOUND MOVES: IPOD CULTURE AND URBAN EXPERIENCE (2006) 
(examining how the iPod and other portable devices are changing the audio experience of public 
places). 
276. See Frug, supra note 263, at I 092 (describing new urbanist efforts to make public space 
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more user-friendly places. But the quality of public presence and 
interaction, particularly as it concerns the exercise of public expressive 
liberties, is another matter. If we turn our public places into home offices 
and shield ourselves in mobile technology bubbles, people will become 
increasingly disconnected in public. The phenomenon of absent presence 
will negatively affect the identity, participation, and transparency 
functions of public places. 
3. The Purification of Public Places 
Chance encounters and expressive noise will not be the only things 
missing in networked public places. Other forms of spatial purification 
will also occur. Again, public places serve their functions best when a 
multitude of expressive forms-symbols, acts, and theater-are present. 
As noted, urban social critics contend that the modern built environment 
places a premium on recreation and mass consumption rather than social 
interaction. 277 The networking of public places will exacerbate this 
problem in ways that we are only now beginning to appreciate. 
Urban geographers have offered a very strong case to the effect that 
public surveillance, in particular, will cause a purification of public places. 
Open and dynamic places will be "replaced by pseudo-public spaces like 
those in shopping malls, where commercial imperatives dominate and 
what goes on, and who participates, is intensely regulated and tightly 
controlled so that profitable consumption is maximized."278 As these 
places facilitate more and more consumption, they will leave less and less 
space for ordinary expressive activities. 
Even in once quintessential public places, protest and dissent in 
particular may be deemed almost entirely out of place, because of the gaze 
of constant surveillance. Professors Kang and Cuff show rather 
convincingly how embedded computing in malls-their chosen spatial 
paradigm-can "control access, facilitate policing, [and] minimize 
loitering. "279 These effects are not, of course, limited to malls. The 
combination of surveillance, digital awareness, and constant identification 
may just as readily be used to control access to and facilitate policing of 
parks, squares and other public places. 
If applied across the full range of the expressive topography-from 
more interactive). 
277. See Michael Sorkin,Introduction to VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK, supra note 243, at 
XI (describing cities as theme parks revolving around consumption while sacrificing human 
interaction); FLUSTY, supra note 274, at 12. 
278. Michael McCahill, Beyond Foucault: Towards a Contemporary Theory of Surveillance, 
in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 41, 52 (Clive Norris, Jade 
Moran & Gary Armstrong eds., 1998). 
279. Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 121. 
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malls to parks to squares-network controls may substantially affect the 
identity, self-governance, and transparency functions of public places. For 
instance, Kang and Cuff note that in a mall, technology could provide "an 
additional, more sophisticated and granular layer of access control."280 
Individuals might be discouraged from entering the space of the mall by 
means of a "blacklist" generated by a combination of computer algorithms 
and embedded tags and devices.281 If patron identification difficulties 
could be resolved, perhaps by some sort of frequent-shopper tag or card, 
Kang and Cuff note the possibility of exclusion of "those with any brush 
with law enforcement, mental illness, or civil disturbance could be seen as 
socially reasonable."282 
Public places like squares and parks might be similarly purified of 
potential threats to public order and safety. Using the full network power 
of video surveillance, future biometric technologies, wireless Internet data, 
and mobile GPS devices, it may be possible to identify in advance and 
exclude certain persons from demonstrations, campaign events, or other 
public gatherings. The policing of place, which would be mostly covert, 
might even be used to detain or discourage certain speakers. This is not the 
stuff of science fiction fantasy. At least one company claims to have 
developed "a fully automated facial recognition system based on neural 
network software ... which can scan the faces ofthe crowd in 'real' time 
and compare the faces with images of known 'troublemakers' held on a 
digital database. "283 In an era when preemptive governmental intervention 
and watch lists are increasingly becoming the norm, it is not hard to 
imagine officials seeking to prevent potentially disruptive protesters from 
occupying certain public places in advance. 
The networking of public places may, however, have even broader 
effects on the identity and participation functions. Evidence from social 
science suggests that women, the homeless, and people of color experience 
being in material public places differently than do other citizens. 284 
Scholars have noted that public surveillance "raises major questions about 
geographic change, social control, patterns of inclusion and exclusion ... 
and the spatial dynamics of the so-called information society."285 Some 
studies also indicate that officials use surveillance technologies to purify 
280. /d. at 122. 
281. /d. 
282. /d. at 124. 
283. NORRIS & ARMSTRONG, supra note 166, at 217. 
284. See NIELSEN, supra note 148, at 6 (noting that "simply being in public is different for 
white women, people of color, and those in poverty''). 
285. Stephen Graham, Spaces of Surveillant Simulation: New Technologies, Digital 
Representations, and Material Geographies, in 16 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING D: SOCIETY AND 
SPACE 483-504 (1998). 
60 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
public places of groups like the homeless and teenagers.286 Others have 
shown that surveillance has targeted women for voyeuristic reasons and 
has been used to profile racial minorities. 287 Other groups, including 
homosexuals, may also experience networked public places differently.288 
Today, of course, it is not difficult to imagine Muslim citizens living a 
chilled public life in places where every word and gesture is potentially 
subject to official and unofficial surveillance techniques.289 
Surveillance is not the only network feature that may chill certain 
forms of expression and association. Professors Kang and Cuff ask: 
How likely are you to walk through the gay and lesbian 
studies section of Borders if you are closeted and know that 
RFID readers are locked on your body? How likely will you 
be to grouse about the administration if you are an Arab 
American male, walking with fellow Arab American friends, 
after the Department of Homeland Security has just warned 
about terrorist plots in the malls?290 
Eventually, embedded technologies like digital tags will raise these sorts 
of concerns in all public places. A constantly authenticating spatial 
environment may drive certain forms of identity and participation 
underground---'()r at least away from certain networked public places.291 
While some may be encouraged by features like wireless access to 
populate networked places, others may be deterred from doing so by other 
features of the networked environment. 
The upshot is that in presently very difficult to quantify ways, the 
networking of public places may have a leveling and sterilizing effect on 
public expressive life. Certain individual and group speech activities may 
be less and less visible in networked places. Certain forms of speech may 
begin to disappear as the phenomenon of anticipatory conformity cleanses 
286. Katherine S. Williams & Craig Johnstone, The Politics of the Selective Gaze: Closed 
Circuit Television and the Policing of Public Space, 34 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 183, 193 (2000). 
287. See Koskela, supra note 146, at 257-78; Williams & Johnstone, supra note 286, at 193. 
288. See Jeffrey Rosen, A WatchfUl State, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 6 (Magazine}, at38, 93 
(noting homosexuals may be inhibited by the presence of public surveillance cameras). 
289. See Andrea Elliott, After 9111, Arab Americans Fear Police Acts, Study Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 2006, at Al5; see also Blitz, supra note 6, at 680-81 (examining implications of 
monitoring urban spaces in order to protect against terrorist threats). 
290. See Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 127 (footnote omitted); see also Cohen, supra note 4, 
at 31 (noting that "the shift to networked space changes the character of existing space even for 
those people who are unaware of its presence"). 
291. See Clive Norris, From Personal to Digital: CCTV. the Panopticon, and the 
Technological Mediation of Suspicion and Social Control, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: 
PRIVACY, RISK AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 278 (David Lyon ed., 2002) (noting that "it is the 
computer-not the camera-that heralds the panopticonization of urban space"). 
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public places of all but the most acceptable displays.292 Dissent and 
disruption, which are already subject to a growing number of material 
spatial regulations, will be even less likely to appear in networked public 
places.293 Privacy experts have noted that surveillance and data retention 
tend to substantially dampen spontaneous behavior. 294 These things 
internalize control and produce a degree of self-vigilance. 295 Whether or 
not any of these effects is sufficient to constitute the prohibited chilling of 
expression, they will most certainly affect the expressive functioning of 
public places. 
Many of the features of networked public places will operate in a non-
transparent, even covert, fashion. They will have the effects noted above 
in part because people will not know to what extent they are being 
watched, by whom, or for what purpose. 296 The automated nature of some 
new surveillance methods, 297 the anonymity of methods of control and 
regulation, and a general uncertainty about the scope and use of the public 
record may breed further mistrust of government, resentment of public 
officials, and consequent avoidance of public places. 
The networking of public places will further diminish what one 
geographer has called the "democratic admixture on the pavements."298 It 
may ultimately contribute to what another scholar calls "the current urban 
malaise. "299 In the purified public square, identity claims and 
292. See supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also Philip Tabor, I Am a Videocam, in 
THE UNKNOWN CITY: CONTESTING ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIAL SPACE 122, 135 (lain Borden et 
al. eds., 200 l) ("The very idea of surveillance evokes curiosity, desire, aggression, guilt, and, above 
all, fear-emotions that interact in daydream dramas of seeing and being seen, concealment and 
self-exposure, attack and defense, seduction and enticement."). 
293. For a discussion of spatial controls, see generally Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra 
note 7 (noting that public spaces are increasingly controlled by spatial regulations that increase 
social and political control). 
294. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 243-44; see also Richard Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some 
Arguments and Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICALDIMENSIONSOFPRN ACY 325-26 (Ferdinand David 
Schoeman ed., 1984). 
295. Hille Koskela, 'The Gaze Without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature 
of Urban Space, 24 PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 243, 253 (2000). 
296. Urban geographers and criminologists have compared the effect of network surveillance 
to the concept of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, a structure that leverages the power of spatiality 
and surveillance to keep prisoners guessing as to whether, when, and how their actions were being 
monitored. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, SURVEILlANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE 108 
(200 1 ); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195-228 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (discussing the Panopticon). 
297. SeeGaryT. Marx, What's New About the "New Surveillance"?: ClassifyingforChange 
and Continuity, l SURVEILLANCE AND Soc'Y 8, 28-29(2002), available at http://www.surveillance-
and-society.org/articlesl/whatsnew.pdf (noting automation of new surveillance technologies). 
298. MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 231 (1990). 
299. Jon Bannister, Nicholas R. Fyfe & Ade Kearns, Closed Circuit Television and the City, 
in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL, supra note 278, at 21-22. 
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unconventional modes of participation will be segregated and managed by 
non-transparent networking features like surveillance and automated 
identification.300 Public places will be far less attractive venues for self-
governance and other public democratic functions. · 
D. Retaining the Civic Character of Public 
Places-Some Modest Proposals 
The networking of public places may challenge the democratic and 
expressive functioning of places by creating a new public digital divide, 
distracting public speakers and audiences, and further sanitizing public 
venues. It is important to recognize these potential effects in advance of 
the full networking of public places. There is no preventing this 
networking. It will happen. Indeed it is already happening. But there are 
some steps that might be taken to counteract at least some of these 
changes, thus preserving or at least making possible more robust civic and 
expressive public places. This section briefly discusses a few modest 
proposals that relate to preserving the basic First Amendment functions of 
public places. 
1. Ownership and Access 
As access to communications technologies becomes increasingly 
critical to the identity and participation functions of networked public 
places, differential access to these technologies necessarily becomes a 
greater concern. The focus in studies of the digital divide has thus far been 
on access provided in private places like the home or public settings like 
schools.301 Given the strong trend toward public place networking, we 
must now also begin to address a nascent divide that will affect public 
expressive space on a large scale. 
In the not-so-distant future, access to the latest technologies of 
communication will be required for effective communication-with 
government in soll)e cases and with fellow citizens in others-in public 
places. Thus the manner in which municipalities provide public Web 
access will be critically important to public expression. To maintain the 
leveling quality of public places, it will be increasingly important that as 
many citizens as possible have access to the latest technologies. 
It is important that municipalities that provide wireless public access 
own and maintain their networks. Like roads, wireless networks will 
300. See Don Mitchell, The End of Public Space? People's Park, Definitions of the Public, 
and Democracy, 85 ANNALS OF THE AsS'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 108, 115 (1995) (noting that 
surveillance creates "planned, controlled, ordered space") (footnote omitted). 
301. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 266 (measuring access to the Internet 
in homes and schools). 
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require continuous upgrades. Individual companies or groups of service 
providers may not be willing to undertake the necessary repairs. In 
addition, by owning the networks officials can ensure that the public has 
open access to them. Like the streets themselves, wireless clouds should 
not be subject to myriad private access restrictions. If cities are committed 
to providing this new means of communication, they should be willing to 
invest substantially in the expressive infrastructure of the future. 
In addition, the provision of tiered public access is particularly 
troublesome. The desire to subsidize public costs is understandable. Public 
Internet access ought, however, to be freely available to members of the 
public. There should not be classes of wireless connectivity, with the 
highest speeds and applications available only to those with the means to 
pay. This would be like restricting some citizens to a virtual sidewalk 
while others speed past on a moving sidewalk. There are, of course, 
circumstances in which citizens are required to pay for access to the means 
of communication. For example, permitting schemes for demonstrations 
and parades sometimes require pre-insurance or the posting of a bond.302 
But these requirements generally relate to possible damage that might 
result from the expressive activity. The public Web platform-the clouds 
and meshes above public areas-is not characterized by scarcity or any 
other cost resulting from specific or additional users. Thus, there ought to 
be no permit fee for public wireless use. 
Access concerns extend beyond wireless portals. In the fully networked 
environment a mere Internet connection will not suffice to facilitate 
effective expression. Public citizens will need the appropriate mobile 
technologies as well. These mobile devices will link people to the public 
network. Hand-held, worn, and portable communications technologies will 
become basic requisites for communicating with institutions and 
governments. Public safety announcements, for example, may be delivered 
over public networks. Devices will also be needed for social networking 
and collective public action. As Kang and Cuff suggest, a "datasense" will 
be required for full participation in public life. Governments of course 
have no constitutional obligation to subsidize access to the latest 
communications technologies. But if they are going to facilitate public 
connectivity then they should also consider supporting access to the 
communicative technologies needed to communicate in a networked 
environment. 303 
302. See C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, 
Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 NW. U. L. REv. 937, 992 (1983) (analyzing parade permit 
requirements). 
303. See SUNSTEIN, REPUBUC.COM, supra note 272, at 182-89 (addressing means for 
facilitating access to diverse viewpoints, including redesign of web pages and government 
subsidies). 
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2. Regulatory Transparency 
As noted, surveillance may substantially affect use of networked public 
places. Citizens' knowledge of official access and other controls in public 
places may turn out to be critical to the functioning of public places and 
public expression. 
As others have advised, governments should start now to develop 
protocols and regulations that limit public surveillance activity and the 
collection and retention of citizen data.304 Adoption of surveillance 
programs should be the result of an open and transparent public process. 
Among other things, communities should seriously and publicly debate 
whether they need a surveillance system at all. Installation should be based 
not on whether federal or state funds are available but a fair assessment of 
whether public surveillance of an area is actually needed to address a real 
safety or security concern. Any surveillance program should be closely 
tailored to the publicly stated governmental purpose supporting it. This 
tailoring should include treatment of the degree of surveillance 
sophistication needed to serve official purposes. Biometrics and other 
invasive technologies should rarely, if ever, be used to monitor public 
places. 
Permanent surveillance of the sort currently operated by the National 
Park Service also should not be used in public places.305 Its use is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the history, tradition, and functions of 
places like the National Mall. Even in the ordinary public square, always-
or usually-on surveillance cameras should not be implemented absent a 
clear and publicly justified safety concern. Again, there must be public 
input as to any proposed surveillance. Public debate regarding any such 
programs should include serious consideration of their effects on public 
liberties like expression and association. 306 
As importantly, citizens should have assurances that the public data 
trails they leave behind are not being collected, stored, mined, or used for 
improper purposes. This observation applies to Muni WiFi programs and 
surveillance camera programs alike. It is not enough that municipalities 
assure that they will not mine private data. Officials must consider 
protocols and regulations for the storage, retention, and retrieval of public 
WiFi data. With respect to both Muni WiFi and public surveillance 
programs, officials should create technological and administrative 
304. See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 286-312 (proposing adoption of measures to implement 
right to public anonymity). For a comprehensive list of suggestions for public surveillance 
programs, see THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 78, at 15-25. 
305. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 78, at 16. 
306. /d. at 18-19 (discussing constitutional concerns and "social 'costs'" of surveillance). 
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safeguards that will encrypt publicly transmitted data, limit access to that 
data, and provide clear guidelines for non-law enforcement access to 
surveillance records.307 Once again, adoption of these protocols and 
regulations should be the result of an open public process. 
Public transparency and accountability will not ensure that expressive 
and associate chill or the sanitizing of public places will not occur. But 
these are minimal steps that can and should be taken to assure citizens that 
public places remain open to identity claims and participatory self-
governance. 308 It is unfortunate that surprisingly few governments have 
taken any ofthese steps to date. 309 The National Park Service, for example, 
has neither sought public input with respect to its surveillance practices on 
the National Mall and other critical public properties nor disclosed the 
nature or extent of that surveillance program to the public.310 It is precisely 
this sort of lack of transparency that may lead to avoidance and 
purification of public places. 
3. Protest Tactics, "Sousveillance," and Civil Disobedience 
Even with these safeguards, we will sometimes be watched when we 
are in public. We cannot rely solely on governments to provide 
transparency. Public places are ultimately a matter of public responsibility. 
Just as civil rights protesters experimented with the sit-in and other 
expressive actions in response to official controls, so too must the modem 
citizen think and act more creatively to preserve spaces for public 
expressive activity. 
As mentioned earlier, technological advances associated with the 
networking of public places might be used to the advantage of public 
protesters and demonstrators.311 With always-on public wireless networks 
and personal computing devices, speakers and assemblies can engage in 
swarming and other tactical maneuvers that will render public displays 
more effective. 312 The power of computer-enhanced social networking can 
be used to counteract some of the most severe official regulations on 
public assembly and expression, including material space restrictions on 
movement and spontaneity. Speakers will be able to communicate with 
one another over vast public spaces, in real time. Official tactics for 
controlling public protests and demonstrations, including corralling and 
zoning public speakers, might be thwarted or at least challenged by 
307. /d. at 20 (encouraging adoption of surveillance protocols and controls). 
308. /d. at 25-35 (providing additional guidelines for the use of public surveillance systems). 
309. Id. at 10-13. 
310. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
3 11. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
312. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 87, at 157-58 (discussing instances in which "smart mobs" 
used technology to thwart official efforts to regulate public displays). 
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counter-tactics like "snake marches" and other spontaneous counter-
movements. 313 
Smarter protests are not the only advance that may limit the repressive 
effects of spatial networking. As mentioned, an army of citizen-journalists 
will occupy networked public places. Their cameras will create an 
unofficial record of what occurred before, during, and after public 
expressive events. On the pragmatic front, this may serve as crucial 
evidence when protesters seek to defend themselves from charges of 
breaching the peace, disorderly conduct, or resisting arrest.314 More 
generally, however, it may restore public confidence in the ability to act 
out and up in public without fearing that an official record of events will 
be the only record available in subsequent proceedings. Private 
surveillance will contribute to public regulatory transparency, as the police 
and other officials are themselves constrained by surveillance. 
Recording events and publishing them to the Web in real space and 
time will also permit protesters to bypass media filters that tend to distort 
protest messages. Citizen-journalists can create and publish a Web page 
as events unfold. Members of an assembly can determine the content of 
these presentations as well as their focus as published. 
The use of cameras at protests is merely one form of"sousveillance," 
or surveillance from below.315 Electrical engineers and sociologists are 
currently partnering to design wearable computers that in effect watch our 
official watchers.316 This inverse or counter-surveillance re-situates the 
technologies of surveillance, essentially turning the tables on authorities. 
Sousveillance does not eliminate public surveillance. But it may encourage 
people to engage and dispute rather than fear and thus avoid public 
surveillance-and public places. It signals to authorities that citizens are 
aware of but not intimidated by the presence of surveillance devices. In 
this sense sousveillance can be an empowering activity. 
313. Snake marches are responses to permitting schemes that seek to control the location and 
movement of public demonstrations. Rather than apply for a permit, protesters "snake" in and out 
of streets and roadways. See Luis Fernandez, Policing Space: Social Control and the Anti-
Corporate Globalization Movement, CANADIAN J. OF POUCE & SECURITY SERVS., Winter 2005, 
at 247. 
314. See Jim Dwyer, Videos Chal/engeHundredsofConventionArrests, N.Y. TIMEs,Apr.l2, 
2005, at AI (reporting how a "sprawling body of visual evidence, made possible by inexpensive, 
lightweight cameras in the hands of private citizens, volunteer observers and the police themselves" 
was used by protesters to defend against charges). 
315. See Steve Mann, Jason Nolan & Barry Wellman, Sousveillance: Inventing and Using 
Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, I SURVEillANCE 
& Soc'y 331, 332 (2003), available at http://www.surveillance-and-
society.org/articles 1 (3 )/sousveillance. pdf (describing experiments with sousveillance devices). 
316. !d. at 338-46; see also DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY 
FORCE Us TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRNACY AND FREEDOM? 159-60 (1998) (discussing various 
counter-surveillance technologies). 
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In addition to engaging in their own forms of counter-surveillance, 
citizens can also resist technologies through non-compliance and even, in 
some cases, active interference with cameras.317 They can, for example, 
force governmental transparency by sharing information on the Web about 
the location of surveillance cameras. A creative group known as the 
Surveillance Camera Players uses a form of street theater to highlight and 
expose the location and operation of cameras in New York City.318 This 
very mild form of civil disobedience actually uses a combination of public 
speech, assembly, and network technology to impose transparency on 
public surveillance programs. 
New restrictions on public expression call for new tactics of resistance. 
Counter-surveillance and public awareness campaigns can be effective in 
drawing attention to and imposing transparency on public surveillance 
systems. This may provide some assurance and confidence to public 
protesters otherwise concerned about the repressive effects of networked 
public places. 
4. Laws, Norms, and Architectures 
How the networking of public places affects public expressive behavior 
will ultimately depend upon some combination oflaws, social norms, and 
architectures.319 Of course, legislators could pass new l~\¥S to deal with 
things like drive-by pornography, public spamming, and new forms of 
cyber-stalking. Citizens might adjust their behaviors to take the effects of 
new technologies on public life into account. Engineers could create 
products that facilitate selective receipt of speech and permit surveillance 
without destroying public liberties. 
If there is one clear lesson from the analysis of networked places in this 
Article it is that laws will be increasingly ineffective in terms of regulating 
public expression. In many cases networked expression will be too 
slippery to be regulated and too disconnected from material places to be 
effectively policed. Enacting new laws will not preserve the democratic 
functions of public places. Norms and architectures will be far more 
effective than laws in terms of protecting us from harmful public speech 
and preserving public anonymity.320 
317. See Gary T. Marx, A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and Resisting the New Surveillance, 
59 J. OF Soc. ISSUES 369, 374-84 (2003) (discussing a host of tactics people can use to neutralize 
and resist efforts to collect personal information). 
318. The players are described on their website, The Surveillance Camera Players: Completely 
Distrustful of All Government, http://www.notbored.org/the-scp.html (last visited Nov.l3, 2006). 
319. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 19-22 (1999) (noting 
that law, social norms, architecture, and the market regulate social behavior). 
320. See Blitz, supra note 6, at 718 (noting that preserving expressive liberties in public spaces 
is often "a question of architectural design and planning rather than of First Amendment law"); 
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We will all have to learn to live with the thrusting of expression we 
find offensive and distasteful. This will require honing our ability to 
selectively consume information. It will require some community policing 
of public places-parents shielding children . from sexually explicit 
information, and public shaming of "dirty drivers" and consumers of 
pornography in public parks and on public subways, trains, and buses. 321 
Like the traditional press, citizen-journalists armed with cameras and 
recorders will have to exercise restraint in training their devices on private 
actors in public places. We will all have to become more mindful that in 
casting our eyes downward and plugging our ears, we are destroying 
aspects of the public expressive culture. 
Most important, perhaps, will be the architectures of computer codes 
for the devices we wear and carry and the environment we will inhabit. 
The key will be to design codes that will simultaneously facilitate the open 
exchange of information and monitor space in a fashion that preserves that 
same openness. Software engineers and the architectures they construct 
will be far more important to networked expressive culture than legislative 
or executive decrees.322 These systems will establish protocols of 
protection from unwanted or harassing public expression delivered from 
mobile devices. They will permit us to authenticate our identity or mask 
it. 
Governments are responsible for taking expressive liberties into 
account as they commission new systems and digitize the public 
environment. Of course, we are all responsible for using products and 
programs in a manner that preserves public expressive liberties. As 
compelling as our own sound tracks may be, we must recognize that we 
miss much by heavily filtering our public experiences. 
None of these rather modest proposals will guarantee a return to public 
places or a robust public expressive culture there. But as public places 
become networked, we must begin to consider how we might preserve 
what remains of the identity, self-governance, and transparency functions 
of public places. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have arrived at a critical period of transition insofar as public 
places and public expression are concerned. The material places we have 
Werbach, supra note 101 (also emphasizing the importance of social norms). 
321. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST 
SPEECH IN AMERICA 12 (1986) (noting that social controls like ridicule, humiliation, and social 
shunning are often effectivelyused to regulate offensive expression). 
322. See Kang & Cuff, supra note 4, at 136-39 (proposing various design features to make 
surveillance at malls more transparent). 
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traditionally occupied-and which have substantially influenced norms, 
expectations, and legal doctrines relating to public expression-are 
becoming highly networked. As a result, traditional distinctions between 
private and public speech, and online and offline presence, are rapidly 
fading into extinction. 
The First Amendment implications of the progression toward 
networked public places are serious. Much depends on the scope and use 
of technological advances. Already, however, we can be relatively certain 
that public citizens will become more captive to certain forms of unwanted 
expression, more known (or at least knowable) to governmental authorities 
as they gather and speak in public, and less and less personally engaged in 
expressive communion with one another in public places. There are 
pressing questions with regard to whether, and if so how, old First 
Amendment doctrines and principles might be transported into modernized 
places. 
Of even larger concern are the prospects for continued self-governance 
through and in public places. Reducing the spaces of offline presence by 
providing public wireless networks may replenish public places to some 
degree. But the people there will be less connected as a result of the 
pervasive personal computing they will bring with them. The squares and 
parks they will occupy will likely be even more purified and sterile than 
the commercialized malls many public places have already become. 
Certain marginalized groups and activities may be even less welcome in 
networked public places than they have been in traditional material ones. 
We cannot reverse the progression toward networked public places. 
The forces trending in this direction are much too strong. The features of 
public place networking that are most threatening to public expression can, 
however, be managed. If the public square is to be networked, then 
governments must concentrate on expanding access to crucial means of 
public communication, both in terms of wireless access and the tools that 
ensure public connectivity. Citizens must press officials to make the 
networking of public places a more transparent and politically legitimate 
process. They must also learn to use new technologies to enhance their 
own expressive liberties. Public citizens must use communication devices 
responsibly such that they do not infringe on the public liberties of others. 
In networked public places, formal laws and constitutional principles will 
matter less to the scope of expressive liberties than will new computer 
codes and the behavioral norms that shape their applications. 
